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Abs t ra ct
Donors who try to impose policy conditionality on countries receiving their aid com-
monly face con‡icting incentives between using aid to induce income-increasing reforms and
using aid to assist low-income countries: this con‡ict can lead to a time-consistency prob-
lem. This paper o¤ers a contractual analysis of conditionality, showing how conditionality
contracts are a¤ected by con‡icting donor incentives in the presence of limited commitment
power. Conditionality is shown to survive in an environment with weak donor commitment
power, and it can eliminate the ine¢ciency associated with the no-conditionality outcome.
However, even when conditionality is successfully imposed by donors, there may be an in-
verse relationship between aid and reform across di¤erent aid recipients. Multi-recipient and
hidden-information extensions of the baseline model are also considered.
JEL Classi…cation: D64; D82; F35; O19.
Keywords: foreign aid; conditionality; altruism.
Aid is thus like champagne: in success you deserve it, in failure you need it.
Bauer (1981), p. 91.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Policy conditionality is the practice used by donors (i.e. international …nancial institutions and
bilateral aid agencies) to link the provision of …nancial support to developing countries to the
implementation of pre-speci…ed policy reforms.1 The use of policy conditionality by donors
has been increasingly common and extensive throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as donors have
attempted to guarantee a satisfactory use of their aid. Conditional aid has become a major
factor in the determination of policy-making in many recipient countries, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa, interacting directly with domestic political economy conditions. However, the
e¤ectiveness of conditionality has been frequently questioned, with respect not only to its content
(i.e. the economic rationale of the reforms supported by donors) but also to its design .
¤I am grateful to Chris Adam and Meg Meyer for many helpful comments. I also thank Richard Mash and
participants to a CSAE seminar at Oxford for their remarks.
1We employ the terms “policy conditionality” and “donor conditionality” interchangeably in this paper.
1In terms of design, which is the focus of this paper, policy conditionality is typically criticised
for a lack of credibility. The threat of a cut-o¤ of aid if the policy reforms demanded by donors
are not implemented (which underpins conditionality) is often time inconsistent, given that
donors face incentives to release funds even if the conditionality contract is not adhered to.
This in turn reduces the extent to which conditionality can lead to improved policies and, by
implication, it diminishes the positive impact of aid on recipient countries. Recent empirical
work on the lack of e¤ectiveness of both aid and conditionality (Burnside and Dollar (2000)) has
led to proposals for more donor selectivity in the allocation of foreign aid, i.e. a more focused
targeting of aid on good performers.
This paper provides an analytical treatment of the practice of donor conditionality, employing
a simple dynamic agency model. In particular we focus on the nature and implications of the
apparent incentive incompatibility of conditional aid for donors. This arises because of the
tension between the rationale for conditional aid (rewarding the implementation of good policies)
and the more traditional role of aid as insurance against low-income states.2 The donor’s ex-post
incentives to release aid when the recipient’s income is low undermines the donor’s ability to use
aid promises to induce income-increasing reforms ex-ante. This paper’s main contribution is to
show that conditionality contracts can resolve this con‡ict even in the presence of imperfect (or
weak) donor commitment,3 but are a¤ected by it in terms of their e¤ectiveness in stimulating
reform e¤orts.
T h eb a s e l i n em o d e lp r e s e n t e di nt h i sp a p e ri sb a s e do nad y n a m i ct w o - p l a y e rg a m e ,w h e r e
the players are an altruistic donor and the policy-makers in a recipient country. The latter
consist of a “small”4 and therefore unrepresentative political élite. The donor cares about its
own consumption and the recipient country’s consumption, and displays strictly diminishing
marginal utility in each. The political élite in the recipient country gains utility from its rents
(or share of national income), which are obtained by distorting the economy, thereby failing to
maximise national wealth.
This baseline set-up leads to three related results. Firstly, a Samaritan’s Dilemma situation
may arise if the donor is su¢ciently altruistic: in such a case the political élite in the recipient
country deliberately impoverishes the country in order to qualify for more aid.
Secondly a conditional aid contract, which ex-ante links aid transfers to policy reform, can
improve the e¢ciency of the interaction between donors and recipients. This is because the
equilibrium without conditional aid fails to internalise the externality due to the presence of an
altruistic donor (i.e. the recipient faces sub-optimal incentives to increase domestic production),
and can be Pareto improved by alternative combinations of transfers by the donor and reform
e¤ort by the recipient country.
Thirdly, in the presence of imperfect (or weak) commitment the donor su¤ers from the
con‡ict between aid as “reward” and aid as “insurance” motives, even though a second-best level
of conditionality can still be imposed by a donor, inducing an increase in reforms relative to the
2This con‡ict is discussed by Guillamont and Chauvet (1999), and e¤ectively summarised in the quote by
Bauer given at the beginning of this paper.
3This notion of commitment is formally de…ned in the next section of the paper, and it broadly corresponds
to a situation where a principal cannot commit to punish aid recipients by carrying out “tough” threats, but it
can commit to reward them for ‘good’ behaviour by keeping “nice” promises.
4In the sense of Boone (1996) and McGuire and Olson (1996).
2corresponding no-aid outcome. This is the main result of the paper, showing how conditionality
can survive the donor commitment problem, even if it cannot completely free itself from its
consequences.
This second-best conditionality contract can lead to an inverse l i n kb e t w e e na i da n dr e f o r m
across countries in equilibrium, corresponding to di¤erent degrees of donor altruism between
recipients. This e¤ect arises because a more altruistic donor su¤ers relatively more from the
Samaritan’s Dilemma and needs to satisfy a more demanding participation constraint for the aid
recipient. This makes the “purchase” of reform e¤ort more costly for the donor, inducing it to
settle for less intense conditionality. Therefore, even though conditionality contracts “survive”
with imperfect donor commitment, aid and reforms may vary across countries in a non-monotonic
fashion, giving the impression that conditionality is failing to e¤ectively link aid ‡ows and reform
e¤orts.
Two extensions of the baseline model are also presented in this paper to allow for a richer
characterisation of the donor-recipient relationship: a multi-recipient case and a hidden infor-
mation extension. In a multi-recipient set-up the Samaritan’s Dilemma is less likely to set in for
a given level of altruism, since donor altruism is “shared-out” between more than one recipient.
However, if it does set in, it is more distortionary than in a single-recipient environment, as
recipients compete with each other for donor transfers by impoverishing themselves. Condi-
tionality with imperfect commitment is therefore strengthened in a multi-recipient environment
given the lower likelihood and lower attractiveness to the recipients of the Samaritan’s Dilemma
outcome.
In the hidden information extension of the baseline model the donor does not know how much
the political élite in the recipient country bene…ts from distorting the economy, and it therefore
faces adverse selection. The donor problem is therefore one of mechanism design, and it is for
instance analogous to that of a regulator setting the price of a private monopoly under hidden
information and with costly public transfers (Baron and Myerson (1982)). As in the regulation-
screening problem we obtain that asymmetric information may force the donor to reduce the
intensity of reform relative to the …rst-best. Contrary to the standard optimal mechanism design
result we …nd that the principal may distort the level of reform for both types, implying a failure
of the “no distortions at the top” result. This is due to the direct interaction between aid and
reforms in the agent’s utility function, which implies that the donor …nds it optimal to grant the
required information rents for low-cost types by simultaneously increasing aid ‡ows and raising
their appropriation rate (which makes aid more e¤ective in providing information rents).
Both the results of the baseline model and of its extensions have implications for the recent
proposals to re-design donor conditionality and, in particular, for the calls for greater selectivity
in the allocation of aid. The nature of conditionality with weak commitment suggests that the
failure of conditionality to induce reforms may be only apparent, therefore undermining some of
the justi…cation for a more selective use of aid. The hidden information extension also suggests
that excluding “bad” types from conditionality contracts (which is one possible implication of
a move towards more selectivity), is sub-optimal, from the donor’s perspective, even though
it implies more e¤ective conditionality on good types. Finally, the multi-recipient extensions
shows that inter-recipient competition for aid can strengthen conditionality, even in the absence
of strong donor commitment. If selectivity is interpreted as a mechanism to introduce a yardstick
3element to conditionality, then it is likely to be an e¤ective reform of this practice.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to work in two areas of the literature. The …rst, and closest, is the
recent work on donor conditionality and aid e¤ectiveness. This work has to a large extent
been stimulated by recent empirical …ndings that foreign aid does not lead to higher growth in
developing countries on average, but that it does so in good policy environments (Boone (1996);
Burnside and Dollar (2000)). This suggests that conditioning aid on good policies is a practice
which can enhance aid e¤ectiveness. However the work of Burnside and Dollar also shows that
empirically conditionality has failed, by not rewarding countries with satisfactory policies and
by failing to induce policy change. These results have led to the calls for greater selectivity on
the part of donors, i.e. focusing aid on good performers, and conditioning aid on policy levels
rather than on policy improvements (e.g. Collier (1997); Dollar and Svensson (2000)).
A number of analytical papers have attempted to clarify the issue of the apparent failure
of both aid and conditionality in raising growth in recipient countries, establishing two main
results. The …rst is that conditionality can be seen as an e¢cient contract, which allows donors to
“purchase” reform from policy makers in developing countries and optimally realise “gains from
aid” (e.g. Adam and O’Connell (1999); Coate and Morris (1995); and, earlier, Mosley (1987)).
The second is that the imperfect donor commitment can drastically limit the e¤ectiveness of
conditionality and, by implication, of foreign aid (e.g. Svensson (2000a)). This paper builds
upon this analytical work on conditional aid, combining these two results, and showing how
they can jointly produce outcomes which are consistent with the evidence on the e¤ectiveness
of donor conditionality.
The second strand of the literature which this paper is related to is the work on the e¤ects
of altruism in economic interactions. This work originates with Becker (1974) and his Rotten
Kid Theorem. This states that the altruism externality between a parent and a sel…sh kid does
not lead to an ine¢cient outcome as long as certain conditions are met.5 A particular failure
of the Rotten Kid Theorem, the Samaritan’s Dilemma, has attracted attention in the literature
(Buchanan (1974)). This has been formally analysed by a number of authors (e.g. Lindbeck
and Weibull (1988) and Bergstrom (1989)), and it refers to the fact that a sel…sh recipient may
act strategically (and in an ine¢cient fashion) in a dynamic environment, in order to maximise
his bene…t from another agent’s altruism. This paper illustrates how the Samaritan’s Dilemma
can apply to donor-recipient relationships in the context of foreign aid, and how contracts (i.e.
policy conditionality) can be designed to remove the ine¢ciency associated with the Samaritan’s
Dilemma outcome.
1.2 Structure and Approach of the Paper
The next section of the paper presents our baseline model of donor-recipient interaction, which
is a dynamic (i.e. two-period), principal-agent model with no information asymmetries. This
5The Rotten Kid Theorem holds if the kid’s only source of utility is money income, if the kid’s consumption
is a normal good from the parent’s perspective, and if optimal monetary transfers from the parent to the kid are
n o ta tac o r n e rs o l u t i o n .
4stylised model allows us to isolate the respective roles of the recipient country’s inherent Stackel-
berg advantage and of the donor’s access to commitment technology in determining the intensity
of policy conditionality.
Section 3 develops two extensions of the core model: a multi-recipient and a hidden infor-
mation one. Both of these allow us to enrich the model of Section 2, and to illustrate how
considerations which are of empirical relevance to the donor-recipient relationship can a¤ect the
nature of policy conditionality.6
Section 4 discusses some of the policy implications of our results, with particular reference
to the recent debate on how to reform policy conditionality. In this section we provide a critical
assessment of the calls for greater donor selectivity in allocating aid to recipient countries, on
the basis of the modelling results obtained in the paper. We also discuss the possible interaction
between the e¤ectiveness of aid and that of conditionality, illustrating the presence of a causal
link between the two which can improve the donors’ hand vis-à-vis aid recipients.
Section 5 summarises the main results and concludes.
2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Set-up
Consider an altruistic7 donor and a sel…sh recipient who interact over two periods, a production
period and a consumption period. The population of both countries consists of a political élite,
which sets public policies, and of politically powerless masses. The size and preferences of the
élite are assumed to be …xed and exogenous.
2.1.1 Production
Production in both donor and recipient countries is a function of a uni-dimensional “political”
variable ® which measures the share of the country’s resources which the political élite appro-
priates for illegitimate private consumption. ® is therefore restricted to range between 0 and
1. Elites can raise ® via the impositions of market distortions,s u c ha se x p o r to ri n c o m et a x e s
and foreign exchange or credit rationing, which enable the ruling élite to accumulate rents (as in
e.g. Krueger (1974); Bhagwati (1982); and McGuire and Olson (1996)). These distortions also
have the e¤ect of lowering income (or growth) in the country, by preventing the achievement of
e¢ciency in exchange and production (see e.g. Barro (1990) and Easterly (1992)). The variable
® is therefore an inverse indicator of market reforms, which stimulate overall income but hurt
the ruling élite if this is insu¢ciently representative of the collective interest.
6Both of these elements of the aid game are present in Svensson’s (2000a) model, which is the closest in spirit
to the one developed in this paper. Our work di¤ers from Svensson in the characterisation of the issue of donor
commitment, and in the fact that we analyse the various elements present in Svensson’s model in turn, isolating
their impact on policy conditionality. We also abstract from the issue of hidden action, and consider the case of
hidden information instead.
7Donor “altruism” in this context is consistent with a number of factors which may lead a country to bene…t
from the consumption of another country, e.g. outstanding loans in the recipient country; “strategic interest”
(e.g. as de…ned by Alesina and Dollar (2000)); poverty concerns.
5T h ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o no fc o u n t r yi is given by the following expression:
yi = !i(1 ¡ ®
°
i ) (1)
where yi indicates income, !i represents the country’s full economic potential, achieved if
no distortions are imposed (i.e. ®i =0 ), and ° ¸ 1, implying that there are weakly increasing
costs of distortions in terms of foregone income. We assume that the process generating income
is deterministic.
2.1.2 Consumption
Aggregate consumption in each country is a function of domestic production and of the level of
foreign aid transfers t from the donor to the recipient. Therefore:
cd = yd ¡ t (2)
cr = yr + t (3)
where c stands for consumption, d and r refer to the donor and recipient country respectively,
and t ¸ 0: The functions given above assume that aid e¤ectiveness in the recipient country
(i.e. the impact of aid on income) is …xed, and independent of the level of distortions ®.I n
section 4, when discussing our main results and their relationship with the recent debate on
aid e¤ectiveness, we relax this assumption, and allow for the possibility of a “Burnside-Dollar”
interaction between reform and aid e¤ectiveness.
2.1.3 Utility
The utility of the political élites is a function of their share ®i of national consumption ci,a n d
of their type (as de…ned below). Elites in the donor country are altruistic towards the recipient
country and care about aggregate consumption in the recipient country cr.8 Utility functions
are strictly concave and assumed to be logarithmic for simplicity. Therefore:
Ud (®d;® r;t;¯;µd)=l n ®
µd
d cd + ¯ lncr (4)
Ur (®r;t;µr)=l n ®µr
r cr (5)
where Ui denotes the utility of the political élite in country i, ¯ measures donor altruism
(¯ 2 [0;1]), and µi is a parameter which captures the e¤ectiveness of resource appropriation
on the part of the ruling élite and which therefore de…nes the type o ft h eé l i t e ,r e l a t i v et oh o w
costly it …nds it to introduce market-friendly reforms (i.e. lowering ®i). µi is restricted to range
between 0 and 1, with high values implying a high cost of introducing reforms.9
8This implies that the donor cares about both élite and non-élite consumption. A donor mainly driven by
poverty concerns would care only about non-élite consumption (i.e. ¯ ln(1¡®r)cr would enter its utility function).
Allowing for this would not alter the qualitative results on conditionality presented in what follows.
9It is possible to think of µi as an inverse index for the size of the élite, where higher values are associated
with smaller and less representative élites, which …nd reforms less costly than larger élites (as in Boone (1996)
and in McGuire and Olson (1996)).
The most natural value for µi to take is unity, as this implies that élites consume their share of national income.
6The functional form for the utility of the ruling élites implies that aid is fully fungible in the
recipient country, and that the élite can decide how to use aid in the same way as it can decide
how much to appropriate of national production.10
2.1.4 Timing
The timing of the game between the donor and the recipient country is as follows. In period 1
(the production period) the political élites set the level of their appropriation rate ®i.A t t h e
beginning of period 2 (the consumption period) transfers take place between the donor and the
recipient and then consumption occurs (as speci…ed by equations (2) and (3)).
2.1.5 Parameter and Informational Assumptions
The following parameter assumptions are made in the rest of the paper for analytical simplicity:
² ° =1 , which implies that the production function in both recipient and donor countries
is linear in the level of market distortions;
² !d = !r =1 ; implying that the full economic potential of the donor and the recipient
country is the same, and that any di¤erences in income are due to political economy
factors;11 and
² µd =0 , which implies that the political élite in the donor country is representative of
the whole population and gains nothing from distorting the economy. This implies that
the élite in the donor country always sets ®d =0and obtains yd = !d =1 : Given this
assumption the variables ® and µ hereafter refer to the appropriation rate and the type of
the political élite in the recipient country respectively (allowing us to omit the subscripts
on these variables).
We also assume that the level of distortions in the recipient country ® is perfectly observable
by the donor country.12 This implies that we do not allow for hidden action (i.e. moral hazard)
considerations in our modelling of conditionality contracts, which might weaken the intensity of
the contracts. In the baseline model we also assume that µ is common knowledge. The donor
therefore does not face a hidden information (i.e. adverse selection) problem in designing its
conditionality contract. We relax this assumption in Section 3.2 of the paper, and show how
conditionality needs to be modi…ed in presence of incomplete information about the recipient’s
type.
10This is consistent with recent empirical work on aid fungibility, e.g. Feyzioglu et al. (1998).
11This is clearly a strong assumption, which we make to focus our results on the impact of political economy
considerations on the incentive e¤ects of foreign aid and to guarantee the existence of interior solutions in the
presence of a linear production function (° =1 ).
12Given the absence of stochastic shocks to income, this is equivalent to assuming that yr is observable, which
implies that ® can be deduced from its level.
72.2 The Unconditional Aid Equilibrium
In this sub-section we solve for the unconditional aid equilibrium of the game between the donor
and the recipient.13 Aid transfers t are unconditional if they are not determined according to
an explicit contract between players which speci…es t as a function the recipient’s appropriation
rate ®, before ® is chosen.
The set-up introduced above generates a dynamic game of complete and perfect information
between the players, where in the …rst period the recipient picks a level of resource appropriation
®, and in the second period the donor decides how much to transfer to the developing country.
The solution to this game needs to be a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, which is found by back-
wards induction, …rst solving for the donor’s optimal transfer function and then examining the
recipient’s preferred choice of ®, as a function of future donor transfers. This corresponds to a
Stackelberg equilibrium, where the recipient country is the Stackelberg leader.
The optimal unconditional aid function for the donor as a function of the recipient’s income
level is given by:
t¤(®;¯)=a r g m a x
t
(lncd + ¯ lncr)
s:t: : t ¸ 0








The t¤(®;¯) function implies that aid equalises the donor’s marginal utilities from own and
recipient consumption when the non-negativity constraint on t is not binding: The optimal
transfer policy given by equation (6) de…nes a no-aid space (t =0 ), where yr ¸ ¯,a n dap o s i t i v e
transfer area, where the converse is true. For yr <¯the recipient’s consumption frontier expands
outwards, as aid ‡ows are forthcoming in that region, augmenting domestic production (which
is given by the production function described by equation (1)). This is shown in Figure 1.
In the production period the ruling élite in the developing country maximises its utility with
respect to its share of resource appropriation ® given the consumption possibility frontier implied
by the donor’s optimal aid function and by domestic production possibilities. The optimal choice
of ® in the no-conditionality equilibrium (denoted with the superscript NC) is described by the
following Proposition.
Proposition 1 The appropriation rate ® in the subgame perfect (or Stackelberg) equilibrium of
the donor-recipient game with no conditionality can take one of two values, depending on the
level of donor altruism. If this is su¢ciently high a Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium (denoted
by SD, and characterised by positive aid ‡ows) sets in and production in the recipient country
falls relative to the no-aid equilibrium (denoted by NA, and where t =0 ).










for ¯>¯ T (µ)
13Given that the game we consider is played by the élites in the two countries, for simplicity in what follows



















Figure 1: Production and consumption possibility frontiers for the recipient country.
where ¯T(µ) ´ (2µ+1 ¡ 1)¡1, which is strictly decreasing in µ:
Proof. ®NC(¯;µ) is obtained by maximising the objective function of the élite in the re-
cipient country subject to two budget constraints: one with no aid (de…ned by the production
function described in (1)) and one with positive aid ‡ows (as determined by the donor’s optimal
transfer function (6)): These two optimisations deliver two locally optimal levels of the appro-
priation rate for the political élite. The global optimum, de…ned by ®NC(¯;µ), is obtained by
comparing the utilities associated with each local optimum and establishing the threshold value
of the altruism parameter ¯ (i.e. ¯T(µ)) for which one is preferred to the other. Straightforward
di¤erentiation of ¯T(µ) w.r.t. µ s h o w st h a ti ti sd e c r e a s i n gi nµ:
Proposition 1 shows that the presence of a su¢ciently altruistic donor (¯>¯ T (µ)) induces
the political élite in the recipient country to impoverish the country more than in a situation
with no aid, by increasing the level of distortions ® in order to attract higher aid transfers. This
corresponds to a Samaritan’s Dilemma situation, where the presence of a su¢ciently altruistic
donor leads to more ex-ante poverty and ine¢cient behaviour than otherwise (as in Lindbeck
and Weibull (1988)). In this model any equilibrium with positive unconditional aid transfers is
characterised by the Samaritan’s Dilemma.
The solution for ®NC(µ;¯) also shows that the more bene…cial does the ruling élite …nd
introducing distortions (i.e. the higher µ), the higher the level of distortions in both the Samar-
itan’s Dilemma and the no-aid equilibrium and the more likely is the Samaritan’s Dilemma
equilibrium to set in (i.e. ¯T (µ) is lower).
The no-conditionality equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is always Pareto ine¢cient (i.e.
the Rotten Kid Theorem fails), in the sense that there are alternative equilibria in which both
parties in the recipient-donor game are (weakly) better o¤. This is so because the externality due
to donor altruism is not considered by the recipient when making its choice of ®,t h u sl e a d i n gt o
9a sub-optimal outcome.14 This ine¢ciency is shown explicitly in the next section, where condi-
tionality contracts are considered and shown to be e¢cient and, for one type of conditionality,
Pareto superior to the no-conditionality equilibrium.15 Conditionality can therefore be thought
of as a contract introduced by donors precisely to remove the ine¢ciency associated with the
equilibrium without conditionality.
Figure 2 summarises the Cournot-Stackelberg nature of the no-conditionality equilibrium
(for the case µ =1and ¯>¯ T(µ)). The …gure plots both the donor and the recipient’s reaction
functions,16 showing that the no-conditionality point (labelled SD)i sa tt h et a n g e n c yo ft h e
recipient’s iso-utility schedule and the donor’s optimal aid function t¤(®;¯). The …gure also












































Figure 2: Illustration of the no-conditionality equilibrium as a Cournot-Stackelberg game (for
µ =1and ¯>¯ T).
14Following the approach introduced by Bergstrom (1989), the Rotten Kid Theorem fails in our set-up given that
the sel…sh “kid” (i.e the recipient country’s policy-makers) e¤ectively derive utility from two goods (appropriation
of local production and appropriation of aid), implying that they have incentives to distort the former to increase
the latter. If the agent only derived utility from aid, it would face optimal incentives to engage in e¢cient
activities, from the donor’s point of view, in order to maximise the availability of aid.
15As we show below, under conditionality, resource appropriation by the élite in the recipient country falls,
implying that also the masses in the developing country bene…t from the contract.




102.3 The Conditional Aid Equilibria
2.3.1 Donor Commitment and Conditionality
We now introduce the possibility of conditionality in the donor-recipient relationship. That is,
we allow the donor to o¤er a contract at the start of the production period which links the
level of aid transfers t to the implementation of a set of policy reforms (i.e. a reduction in ®)
by the recipient. The contract therefore speci…es a conditional reform-aid pair, f®c;t cg, where
superscript c denotes conditionality.
We identify two cases for donor conditionality, corresponding to two di¤erent degrees of
donor commitment power: strong and weak commitment.
De…nition 1 The donor has strong commitment power if it can commit to a conditionality
contract f®c;t cg w h i c hi ss u c ht h a t :
t =
(
tc if ® = ®c
0 if ® 6= ®c
The donor has weak commitment power if it can only commit to a conditionality contract
f®c;t cg w h i c hi ss u c ht h a t :
t =
(
tc if ® = ®c
t¤(®;¯) if ® 6= ®c
where t¤(®;¯) is the donor’s ex-post optimal aid function (as given by equation (6)).
The donor has no commitment power if it cannot commit to any ex-ante contract, so that
t = t¤(®;¯) for 8®.
A donor with strong commitment power can ex-ante commit to fully depart from its ex-post
optimal aid function. This implies that it can commit to keep promises to reward “good” be-
haviour by the agent (i.e. transfer tc to the recipient if he chooses ®c), and also to carry out
threats to punish the agent (i.e. by giving no aid if the level of reforms ®c is not implemented).
The corresponding conditionality contract (which we de…ne as strong conditionality) can there-
fore e¤ectively disregard the potential for a Samaritan’s Dilemma (or Stackelberg) equilibrium
in the no-conditionality game, and leaves the recipient only as well o¤ as in the no-aid equi-
librium.17 The optimal strong conditionality contract is as shown in Figure 2 (and derived
formally below), and it lies at the tangency between the recipient’s iso-utility contour at the
no-aid equilibrium, and the donor’s iso-utility function.
Conversely, a donor with weak commitment cannot credibly promise to be ‘tough’ if ®c is
not chosen by the recipient: if ® 6= ®c is set by the recipient, the donor will transfer the ex-
post optimal aid level t¤(®;¯). A donor with weak commitment can however commit not to
ex-post renege on a promise of tc, if the recipient implements a level of reforms ®c.T h a t i s ,
the donor is able to commit to depart from its ex-post optimal aid schedule for just one point.
17A donor with strong commitment can therefore appropriate the …rst-mover advantage enjoyed by the recipient
in the no-conditionality game by o¤ering a “tough” contract before the game starts. Pedersen (1996) emphasises
the potential nature of policy conditionality as Stackelberg leadership.
11The corresponding optimal conditionality contract (which we de…ne as weak conditionality)
therefore leaves the recipient as well o¤ as in the no-conditionality equilibrium and it lies at
the tangency between the recipient’s iso-utility curve at the Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium
(assuming ¯>¯ T) and the donor’s iso-utility curve, as is illustrated in Figure 2.
If the donor has no commitment power, than no conditionality can be imposed, and the
equilibrium of the recipient-donor game is the one described by Proposition 1.
In what follows we derive and compare the conditionality contracts corresponding to strong
and weak donor conditionality respectively. Existing models of donor conditionality characterise
the case of strong commitment power (e.g. Coate and Morris (1995); Adam and O’Connell
(1999); Azam and La¤ont (2000); Svensson (2000a)). This has been qualitatively criticised as
unrealistic by many authors (e.g. Gordon (1993); Collier (1997)) given the pressures faced by
donors to release aid when recipients fail to fully implement policy conditionality. Svensson
(2000a) formally shows how lack of donor commitment leads to a collapse of conditionality.
The notion of weak donor commitment introduced here is intermediate between the cases of
full and no commitment, and can restore a form donor conditionality which is capable of avoiding
the ine¢ciencies associated with the no-conditionality equilibrium. Given the requirements on
donor behaviour which underlie the notion of weak commitment (i.e. the ability to keep “nice”
promises and not abuse the trust of recipients by cutting aid ex-post if a previously negotiated
level of reforms is implemented), and the institutional set-up of donor institutions, this form of
commitment and its corresponding conditionality contract appear more plausible than both the
strong and no commitment cases.18 The assumption that no conditionality can be imposed by
donors if they do not have strong commitment power in particular seems an unduly restrictive
one.
The propositions on conditionality presented in this section (Propositions 2 and 3) are for
the case µ =1 , which enables us to obtain closed form solutions for the conditionality contracts.
Lemma 1 extends the results obtained for µ =1t ot h em o r eg e n e r a lc a s eµ · 1, characterising the
impact of the type of the ruling élite in the recipient country on the intensity of the conditionality
contracts.
2.3.2 Strong Conditionality
Access to strong commitment technology enables the donor to obtain optimal “purchase” of
reforms from the ruling élite in the developing country. To do so the donor o¤ers to the ruling
élite at the beginning of the production period a conditional aid contract specifying the level
of aid to be given at the beginning of the consumption period as a function of the level of
distortions chosen during the production period. The strong conditional aid contract therefore
consists of an aid-distortions pair {®c;t cg,s u c ht h a tt = tc if ® = ®c and t =0otherwise.
18Donors’ reputational concerns (e.g. arising from multi-period or multi-recipient interaction) may allow them
to sustain weak conditionality contracts as an equilibrium outcome even in the absence of any donor commitment
power (see e.g. Kreps (1990) and Baker et al. (1994)). Reputational e¤ects can sustain weak but not strong
conditionality if one restricts donors to “punish” recipients who reject the contract by (perfect) Nash-reversion
(rather than allowing for harsher punishment pro…les). This would imply that donors can only reach payo¤ points
North-East of the payo¤ associated with the stage game’s sub-game perfect equilibrium (i.e. the no-conditionality
equilibrium) in a repeated interaction. See Appendix A.2 for a more detailed treatment of this issue.
12To establish the optimal levels of ®c and tc the donor maximises its utility relative to both
the level of transfer t and the levels of distortions ® subject to the ruling élite’s participation
constraint, which speci…es that it is at least as well o¤ in the conditional aid equilibrium as in
the no-aid equilibrium.
The components of the optimal strong conditionality contract ®c
1 and tc
1 (where subscript 1
denotes strong conditionality) are therefore given by the following donor program:
max
®;t
Ud =m a x
®;t
ln(1 ¡ t)+¯ ln(1 ¡ ® + t) (7)





The strong conditionality contract is characterised as follows for the case of µ =1 .
Proposition 2 Strong conditionality in the µ =1case is given by the contract {®c
1(¯;1),
tc
1 (¯;1)} which has the following properties:
(i) the appropriation rate ®c
1 falls with the value of the altruism parameter. ®c









which is strictly decreasing in ¯,a n di ss u c ht h a tlim¯!0 ®c





(ii) the level of aid tc
1 increases with the value of the altruism parameter. tc













which is strictly increasing in ¯,a n di ss u c ht h a tlim¯!0 tc
1(¯;1) = 0 and lim¯!1 tc
1(¯;1) = 1
4;
(iii) the strong conditionality contract is e¢cient, and Pareto superior to the no-aid outcome
described in Proposition 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
Proposition 2 shows that an altruistic donor with access to strong commitment technology
“purchases” reform in the recipient country by means of aid ‡ows. Distortions in the recipient
country are always lower than with no conditionality and conditionality is an enabling condition
for aid in the case of ¯ · ¯T (µ) (given that this case corresponds to the no-aid equilibrium in
the absence of conditionality). Under strong conditionality aid has a multiplier e¤ect, raising
income in the developing country by more than the aid ‡ows,19 and is positively correlated with
reform e¤ort (as the value of the altruism parameter changes).
19This replicates the results obtained by both Coate and Morris (1995) and Adam and O’Connell (1999).
132.3.3 Weak Conditionality
In the absence of strong commitment technology the donor cannot impose strong conditionality.
This is because if the donor is su¢ciently altruistic (i.e. for ¯>¯ T (µ)); the ruling élite in
the recipient country is better o¤ by disregarding the strong conditionality contract and opting
for the Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium, which yields more utility than the no-aid equilibrium
(by Proposition 1). Given that a donor without strong commitment powers cannot commit to
implement strong conditionality (under which t =0for ® 6= ®c
1), the recipient knows that once
presented with the fait accompli of ® = ®SD >® c
1 the donor will transfer funds according to its
optimal aid function, t¤(®;¯). The recipient would therefore choose ® = ®SD if o¤ered a strong
conditionality contract when ¯>¯ T (µ).
A donor with weak commitment power can however achieve weak conditionality, which dif-
fers from strong conditionality in the de…nition of the participation constraint of the élite of
the recipient country, given that it has to take into account the potential for the Samaritan’s
Dilemma. That is, under weak conditionality the donor needs to guarantee to the recipient that
its utility will be as high as in the no-conditionality equilibrium described in Proposition 1.
Weak conditionality is therefore de…ned by the following donor program:
max
®;t
Ud =m a x
®;t
ln(1 ¡ t)+¯ ln(1 ¡ ® + t) (10)
s:t: :
(
Ur(®;t;µ) ¸ Ur(®SD(µ);t ¤ ¡
®SD(µ);¯
¢
;µ) for ¯>¯ T(µ)
Ur(®;t;µ) ¸ Ur(®NA(µ);0;µ) for ¯ · ¯T(µ)
(IR)
The weak conditionality contract is characterised as follows, for µ =1 .
Proposition 3 The weak conditionality contract {®c
2(¯;1);t c
2 (¯;1)} has the following proper-
ties:
(i) the appropriation rate ®c
2 increases with ¯ if the corresponding no-conditionality equilib-
rium is characterised by the Samaritan’s Dilemma. ®c





1¡¯ for ¯>¯ T(1)
®c
1(¯;1) for ¯ · ¯T(1)
(11)
which is strictly increasing in ¯ for ¯>¯ T(1) a n di ss u c ht h a tlim¯!1 ®c
2(¯;1) = 1
2;
(ii) the level of aid tc











¯¡¯)(1¡¯2) for ¯>¯ T(1)
tc





(iii) aid under weak conditionality is strictly higher than under strong conditionality if altru-
ism is su¢ciently high, i.e. tc
2(¯;1) >t c
1(¯;1) for ¯>¯ T(1):
(iv) the weak conditionality contract is e¢cient, and Pareto superior to the no-conditionality
equilibrium described in Proposition 1.
14Proof. See Appendix A.1.2.
Proposition 3 (in conjunction with Proposition 2) shows that also under weak conditionality
there is purchase of reforms by the donor relative to the no-aid outcome (i.e. ®c
2(¯;1) · 1
2).
However the degree of reforms imposed under weak conditionality falls with the value of the
altruism parameter ¯ for values of ¯ higher than the threshold value ¯T(1) and is therefore
always lower than the level of reforms attained under strong conditionality. This is because
under weak conditionality reforms are more expensive for the donor as the ruling élite in the
recipient country has a higher reservation utility. Moreover the recipient’s reservation utility
increases with donor altruism, making the purchase of reforms via conditionality increasingly
costly for the donor and inducing it to settle for lower levels of reform e¤ort (see Figure 3, which
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Figure 3: The appropriation rate under strong and weak conditionality (for µ =1 ).
Conversely, aid is higher under weak conditionality if the donor is su¢ciently altruistic
(¯>¯ T(1)), since the donor needs to make higher transfers to induce the recipient to reform
when the recipient’s reservation utility is higher. Aid ‡ows increase with donor altruism, and do
so faster than under strong conditionality (see Figure 4).20 A perfectly altruistic donor (¯ =1 )
transfers half of its wealth to the recipient, with no impact on reform e¤ort relative to the no-aid
benchmark (i.e. ® = 1
2).
Proposition 3 implies that in equilibrium there can be an inverse relationship between aid
and reforms across di¤erent recipients, driven by di¤erent degrees of donor altruism.21 This is
20I ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt os h o wt h a ti nt h ed e t e r m i n a t i o no fn o n - é l i t ec o n s u m p t i o nt h i s“ a i de ¤ e c t ”o fh i g h e r
altruism outweighs the corresponding “élite appropriation e¤ect”, ensuring the presence of an increasing (and




21This relationship abstracts from issues of inter-recipient competition for aid, which we analyse in the next
section.
Donor altruism may vary across recipient countries as a function of a number of factors (e.g. their strategic





















































Figure 4: Aid ‡ows under strong and weak conditionality (for µ =1 ).
because recipients with a more altruistic donor reform less and receive more aid than recipients
with a less altruistic donor (for a given type of the ruling élite in the recipient country). As the
altruism parameter varies between 0 and 1 we obtain an inverse U-shaped relationship between
aid and reform (de…ned as 1 ¡ ®), which is plotted in Figure 5.22 Under strong conditionality
on the other hand the relationship between aid and reforms is monotonic.
This baseline model of conditionality with imperfect (i.e. weak) donor commitment can
accommodate some of the recent stylised evidence on aid and conditionality. The relationship
between aid and reform implied by Proposition 3 suggests this may not be monotonic across
countries, if donor altruism varies across them. This can help account for the …ndings of Burnside
and Dollar (1997)23 that aid has had no impact on policies in recipient countries. Moreover the
existence of a negatively sloped aid-reform schedule supports the empirical …ndings of Collier
and Dollar (1999), who …nd that aid tapers o¤ in good policy environments.
The main policy implication arising from the baseline model is that policy conditionality can
be imposed by donors who do not have access to strong commitment technology, and that this is
more e¢cient than the no-conditionality outcome. Donors may however be tempted to give up
on traditional policy conditionality given its apparent failure (which manifests itself as a negative
relationship between aid and reform), and experiment with novel forms of conditionality, such
as “selectivity”. As we have shown so far this failure of traditional conditionality maybe only
apparent (i.e. conditionality does not collapse in the absence of strong commitment). Moreover
the ‘unpleasant’ properties associated with weak conditionality from the donor’s perspective (i.e.
the fact that more altruism weakens conditionality) are due to structural Samaritan’s Dilemma
22The plot is obtained by tracing out the values of t and 1 ¡ ® under strong and weak conditionality which
correspond to values of the altruism parameter ¯ between 0 and 1.
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Figure 5: The relationship between aid and reform under strong and weak conditionality, for
di¤erent values of ¯ 2 [0;1].
dynamics which cannot be easily overcome by changing the rules of the conditionality contract.
We expand on both of these points in Section 4.1, where we discuss the issue of how to reform
traditional policy conditionality and of how to introduce greater selectivity in the allocation of
aid.
2.4 Conditionality in the General µ · 1 Case
The following Lemma generalises the results obtained in Propositions 2 and 3 on conditional
reform e¤ort to the µ · 1 case. This result is used in Section 3.2 of the paper, in the context of
the hidden information extension of the baseline model.
Lemma 1
(i) The appropriation rate under the strong conditionality contract ®c
1(¯;µ) falls with the cost








Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.
To sum up, this section of the paper has analysed a stylised principal-agent model of donor-
recipient interaction obtaining the following results: in the absence of conditionality the donor
and the recipient interact ine¢ciently, and the recipient enjoys a Stackelberg advantage which
can lead to a Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium if donor altruism is su¢ciently high (Proposition
1); a conditionality contract can remove the ine¢ciency associated with the no-conditionality
17outcome, and its intensity is a function of the strength of donor commitment; strong condition-
ality implies an optimal purchase of reforms on the part of donors and a positive link between
aid and reform as altruism varies (Proposition 2); weak conditionality needs to leave the re-
cipient as well o¤ as in the no-conditionality outcome, implying that reforms are lower and aid
higher than under strong conditionality, and that reforms and aid can be inversely related across
countries if donor altruism varies (Proposition 3); and, …nally, the intensity of both strong and
weak conditionality is negatively related to the cost of introducing income-increasing reforms
for the political élite of the recipient country (Lemma 1).
3 Extensions of the Baseline Model
Two extensions of the baseline model of aid and conditionality are analysed in this section of
the paper. Both of these are relevant to the contemporary debate on how to reform donor
conditionality, and whether to introduce more selectivity in the allocation of aid, which we
discuss in Section 4.
The …rst extension examines the impact of the presence of multiple aid recipients on the
no-conditionality benchmark and on the conditionality contracts. This extension shows that the
presence of more than one recipient leads to two separate e¤ects: a “dilution” of donor altruism,
which is now shared-out between recipients; and strategic interaction between recipients, who
compete with each other for aid. These two e¤ects can play into the hands of a donor in a set-
up with weak donor commitment, by reducing the attractiveness of the Samaritan’s Dilemma
equilibrium for aid recipients, i.e. making their outside option when faced with a conditional-
ity contract less appealing. Conditionality with multiple recipients therefore resembles yardstick
competition (e.g. as in Holmstrom (1982)), in that the intensity of the agent’s contract increases
relative to a single recipient environment. This e¤ect is however not due to the insurance prop-
erties obtained by using comparative performance information, but it is the result of strategic
interaction between the recipients and its implications for the Samaritan’s Dilemma.24
The second extension considered in this section models the impact of asymmetric information
on conditionality contracts. This section draws closely on the literature on mechanism design
and its applications (e.g. the regulation of privatised monopolies). Some non-standard results
are however present in the case of conditionality contracts under adverse selection given the
characteristics of our set-up - in particular the direct interaction between transfers and adjust-
ment e¤ort in the recipient’s utility (i.e. the fact that aid is appropriated in inverse proportion
to adjustment e¤ort) and the presence of type-speci…c reservation utilities.
3.1 Multiple Recipients
In this sub-section we introduce the possibility of a donor facing more than one aid recipient.
We consider here a symmetric case, where two recipients, indexed i and j, have the same cost
of reform (µi = µj) and where donor altruism towards them is the same (¯i = ¯j).
This extension of the baseline model makes it closer to the Svensson (2000a) model and
obtains similar results on the implications of lack of co-ordination between recipients in the no-
24Pietrobelli and Scarpa (1992) argue in favour of yardstick competition in aid contracts on the basis of its
positive informational role, in the context of a moral hazard model with ‘strong’ donor commitment.
18conditionality benchmark. Our additional contribution relative to Svensson (2000a) is to draw
out the implications of inter-recipient competition for aid in a set-up where a conditionality
contract can survive, given the presence of weak donor commitment.
This multi-recipient extension is also similar in spirit to Bernheim et al. (1985) who, in the
context of the family, consider whether a parent can induce an e¢cient provision of old-age care
on the part of her kids by devising an appropriate bequest rule.25
3.1.1 The Unconditional Aid Equilibrium with Multiple Recipients
When faced with two potential aid recipients i and j, the donor’s utility function is as follows:
Ud =l n ( 1¡ ti ¡ tj)+¯ ln(yi + ti)+¯ ln(yj + tj) (13)
Maximising Ud with respect to ti and tj yields the two unconditional aid functions:
t¤
i (®i;® j;¯)=





¯ ¡ yj + ¯(yi ¡ yj)
1+2 ¯
which imply that transfers to one recipient increase with the income of the other recipient,
as the donor re-distributes funds between them optimally. In the symmetric equilibrium of the







which shows that transfers, for the same level of ¯ and yi,a r el o w e rt h a ni nt h es i n g l e
recipient case (see equation (6)) given that altruism is now “diluted”. The same aid function
applies to recipient j.
The fact that the donor transfer function di¤ers from the single recipient case implies that
the no-conditionality equilibrium described in Proposition 1 changes. In particular aid transfers
to each recipient country are now a function of the actions of the other recipient (see equation
(14)), implying that there is strategic interaction between the two. The non-cooperative no-
conditionality equilibrium is characterised as follows.26
Proposition 4 The appropriation rate ® in the non-cooperative sub-game perfect equilibrium






®NA(µ) for ¯ · ¯T
m(µ)
®SD
m (µ) ´ 3µ
1+2µ for ¯>¯ T
m(µ)
(16)
25These authors argue that the presence of multiple recipients allows the parent to introduce a bequest rule
conditional on the provision of old-age care which induces all kids to provide an e¢cient amount and restore
the Rotten Kid theorem. Bernheim et al. however assume that the parent can stand by such a rule, sidestepping
commitment problems, which are central to the issue of conditional aid.
26Throughout this section we denote equilibrium values in the multi-recipient case with the subscript m.
19The Samaritan’s Dilemma value of the appropriation rate, ®SD
m (µ), is higher than in the
single-recipient case (i.e. ®SD





Proof. The no-aid equilibrium with multiple recipients is equal to the corresponding single
recipient case (see Proposition 1), since this is not a function of aid ‡ows from the donor.
The Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium is obtained by maximising recipient utility subject to
the revised donor transfer function (14), which yields the following downwards sloping reaction






and viceversa for recipient j:
The non-cooperative Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two
reaction functions, obtained by imposing ®¤
i(®j)=®¤
j(®i). This is higher than the Samaritan’s
Dilemma equilibrium in the single recipient case for µ<1, as straightforward comparison of the
two values reveals.
As in the single recipient case, the threshold value of the altruism parameter ¯ for which the
Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium sets in is given by equating the utilities of the élites in the
recipient country in the no-aid and Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibria respectively. This is strictly
higher than the corresponding value in the single recipient case (given by Proposition 1), which
can be noted by straightforward comparison of the two values.
Proposition 4 reveals that a multi-recipient setting modi…es the no-conditionality equilibrium
in two related ways. Firstly, the Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium displays a level of distortions
which is always greater or equal than the level obtained in the Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium
of the single recipient case. This is because the political élites in each recipient country compete
for donor funds with the other country by impoverishing their own country and raising the level
of distortions relative to a single-recipient environment. The Nash equilibrium of the period 1
game between recipients is ine¢cient, as players do not internalise the e¤ects of their strategic
interdependence (as in the discretion case in Svensson (2000a)).
Secondly the Samaritan’s Dilemma is less likely to set in than in the single recipient case.
This is because it is relatively more unattractive to each recipient since aid ‡ows are lower (as
donor funds are “shared out” between two recipients) and the level of distortions is higher (due
to “competition” with the other recipient to qualify for more aid).27;28
To sum up, in the multi-recipient no-conditionality equilibrium the Samaritan’s Dilemma is
less likely to set in, but if it does set in it is more distortionary than in a single recipient setting.
27If recipients were able to co-ordinate their behaviour and maximise their aggregate rents, distortions would




2(1+µ)) and the Samaritan’s Dilemma would be











28In the case of “perfect competition” (i.e. n !1 ) the Samaritan’s Dilemma would never realise (¯
T
m ¸ 1).
203.1.2 The Conditionality Equilibria with Multiple Recipients
Conditionality in a multi-recipient setting changes relative to the case modelled in the previous
section for two related reasons.29 Firstly, for a given degree of donor altruism, funds for each
recipient country are scarcer so that the incentives on the part of the donor to induce reforms are
lower. Secondly, the scarcity of funds is such that the recipient’s incentives to behave strategically
and bene…t from the presence of a Samaritan’s Dilemma are lower, as shown above. This in turn
implies that lack of strong commitment technology is less of a constraint on the donor, which in
turn strengthens the intensity of weak conditionality.
Multi-recipient strong conditionality Conditionality in the multi-recipient commitment
case changes relative to the single recipient case only because e¤ective altruism per recipient is
lower. The donor does not bene…t from the lower likelihood of the Samaritan’s Dilemma due to
the presence of multiple recipients, given that, thanks to its ability to commit strongly, it does
not su¤er from the existence of the Samaritan’s Dilemma and does not need to account for it in
the conditionality contract.




Ud =m a x
®;t
ln(1 ¡ 2t)+2 ¯ ln(1 ¡ ® + t) (17)




The following Proposition summarises the features of the strong conditionality contract with
two recipients.
Proposition 5 The multi-recipient strong conditionality contract {®c
1;m(¯);t c
1;m (¯)g has the
following properties:
(i) the strong conditionality appropriation rate ®c
1;m is always higher than under the single-
recipient contract and is decreasing with the degree of altruism. ®c









(ii) the strong conditionality appropriation rate tc
1;m is always lower than under the single-
recipient contract and is increasing with the degree of altruism. tc











1+5 ¯2 ¡ 3¯
´ · tc
1(¯;1)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.4.
With more than one recipient strong conditionality therefore leads to lower transfers and
lower reforms per recipient in equilibrium than in the single agent case, due to the relatively
smaller amount of donor funds available for each country.
29Also in this case, as in the single recipient one, we derive the conditionality contracts only for the case µ =1 ,
for the sake of simplicity and of tractability. We therefore omit the parameter µ as an argument of the various
functions we derive, for notational convenience.
21Multi-recipient weak conditionality Weak conditionality with multiple recipients changes
relative to the single recipient case not only because the no-conditionality benchmark is di¤erent
but also because of the presence of strategic interaction between recipients. This implies that
the conditionality contract needs to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the three-player game.
Whilst it is straightforward to guarantee that conditionality is the unique NE of the three-
player game in the case with strong donor commitment,30 in the weak commitment case the
recipients’ outside option relative to the conditionality contract needs to be modelled explicitly,
and no longer necessarily corresponds to the no-conditionality outcome (as in the single recipient
case), since this does not capture the full extent of the strategic interaction between recipients.
In particular the participation constraint included in the donor program for weak condition-
ality now needs to state that for each player accepting the conditionality contract is optimal
given that the other recipient has accepted it. This guarantees that weak conditionality is a Nash
outcome of the three-player game. It does not however imply that weak conditionality is the
unique NE of the game, since it may still be optimal for a recipient to reject the contract if
the other recipient has also rejected the contract. If this is the case the (“Reject”, “Reject”)
strategy combination is also a NE and is necessarily payo¤ superior (for the recipients) to the
conditionality contract.31
The weak conditionality program is therefore as follows (where the participation constraint
is only shown for recipient i for simplicity):
max
®i;ti;®j;tj
Ud =m a x
®i;ti;®j;tj
ln(1 ¡ ti ¡ tj)+¯ ln(1 ¡ ®i + ti)+¯ ln(1 ¡ ®j + tj) (18)
s:t: : Ur;i (®i;t i) ¸ Ur;i (reject {®i;t igjj accepts {®j;t jg)(IR)









4 for ¯ · ¯T
m;c(tj)
















, which is increasing in tj (see Figure 6 for a plot of this
schedule). As in the single-recipient case there is a threshold level of donor altruism above which
the weak conditionality contracts needs grant to recipients a higher payo¤ than in the no-aid
equilibrium. However in the multi-recipient case both the altruism threshold and the recipient’s
payo¤ for values of altruism above the threshold are no longer constant, and are a function of
the aid transfers tj o¤ered to the other recipient.32
30This is achieved simply by meeting the recipient’s participation constraint, which is pinned down by the
no-aid equilibrium.
31This is because for the (“Reject”, “Reject”) strategy combination to be a NE, rejecting the contract needs to
yield a higher payo¤ to each recipient than accepting the contract, given that the other recipient has rejected it.
This implies that the payo¤ to each aid recipient from the (“Reject”, “Reject”) outcome is higher than from the
(“Accept”, “Accept”) outcome.
32The IR constraint in the single-recipient weak conditionality program corresponds to the multi-recipient IR
constraint for tj =0 .
22In particular, from the recipient i’s perspective, a higher level of tj increases the likelihood
of the no-aid payo¤ being the relevant outside option for the conditionality contract (¯T
m;c(tj)
increases with tj), by lowering the Samaritan’s Dilemma payo¤ which applies for ¯>¯ T
m;c(tj).
This e¤ect is due to the fact that the more aid the donor commits under weak conditionality to
one of the recipients, the less it is willing to transfer to the recipient who rejects the contract. A
donor with access to weak commitment technology in a multi-recipient setting can therefore use
promises of aid both as a bribe to induce reform (as in the single-recipient case), and as a threat
if the contract is not accepted by only one of the recipients. The second e¤ect has strategic
value for the donor in a multi-recipient environment, and it arises from the donor’s ability to
keep its “nice” promises to recipients (i.e. transfer tc
2;m to one recipient if it sets ® = ®c
2;m).33
The IR constraint which applies to the multi-recipient weak conditionality case also implies
that aid recipients are worse o¤ in the multi-recipient context relative to the single-recipient
environment, given that their reservation utility in the single-recipient Samaritan’s Dilemma
case (which equals ln
¯
1+¯, from the IR constraint in the donor’s program (10)) is higher than
the corresponding level in the multi-recipient case for tj > 0.
Given the presence of strategic interaction between aid recipients, the following condition is
also required to guarantee that weak conditionality is the unique NE of the game:
Ur;i (®i;t i) ¸ Ur;i (reject {®i;t igjj rejects {®j;t jg) ) (20)

















1+2¯). This condition simpli…es to the fol-












t¤(¯) is therefore the level of transfers which equalises the recipients’ payo¤s from the Samar-
itan’s Dilemma no-conditionality equilibrium (i.e. the (“Reject”, “Reject”) equilibrium which
realises for ¯ ¸ ¯T
m(1) = 1
2, as from Proposition 4), and the payo¤s from weak conditionality,
as given by the IR constraint in equation (19) for ¯>¯ T
m;c(tj):34 If the level of aid o¤ered in
the weak conditionality contract is above t¤(¯), then a situation where both recipients reject
the contract is a Nash equilibrium, given that the payo¤ under conditionality is relatively low,
due to the properties of the IR constraint (i.e. the negative relationship between the recipient’s
payo¤ under weak conditionality and tj for ¯>¯ T
m;c(tj)).
33The notion of weak commitment technology therefore has stronger implications in a multi-recipient setting




2 case does not need to be checked to establish the uniqueness of the conditionality equilibrium, as
in this case the no-conditionality equilibrium corresponds to the no-aid equilibrium, which necessarily grants less





m;c(t) case (Area I in Figure 6) necessarily displays two NE since the no-conditionality equilib-
rium grants more utility than the no-aid outcome (given ¯>
1
2) whilst recipient utility under weak conditionality
equals the payo¤ from the no-aid outcome (given ¯ · ¯
T
m;c(t)). Meeting the constraint expressed in equation (21)
therefore necessarily rules out this range of ¯ (i.e. the t




2 ( a si ti ss h o w ni nF i g u r e6 ) ) .
23Figure 6 plots the IR constraint and the unique Nash equilibrium condition assuming symme-
try in the conditionality contracts (i.e. ti = tj = t). The shaded area indicates the combinations














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This figure plots two locuses of points, in terms of altruism $ and the level of aid t specified in the weak conditionality
contract. The first schedule, $ mc
T t , () , is the maximum level of the altruism parameter for which the recipient’s payoff
from the weak conditionality contract equals the payoff in the no-aid outcome. If $ >$ mc
T t , () the contract needs to
offer a higher utility to the recipient, compensating it for a Samaritan’s Dilemma counterfactual, which arises if the
recipient rejects the contract. This schedule is upwards sloping given that the more aid is offered under the contract, 
the less attractive is the Samaritan’s Dilemma outcome for the recipient who rejects the contract, and therefore the
higher the necessary level of altruism to bring the payoffs from conditionality and from the Samaritan’s Dilemma
counterfactual into balance. 
The t*($) schedule is the locus of points where the payoff from weak conditionality equals the payoff obtained by
recipients if they both reject the contract. If  t > t*($) recipients are better off if they both reject the contract, given
that a higher level of aid in the contract implies a less attractive outside option if the contract is rejected by only one
recipient, and therefore a less generous IR constraint. This schedule is upwards sloping for the same reasons which
apply to the $ mc
T t , ()  function. The t*($) schedule starts at $ = 0.5, given that for $ < 0.5 the recipients receive no-aid
if they both reject conditionality, which cannot give them more utility than under conditionality. The shaded area
indicates the combination of parameter values for which the donor-recipient weak conditionality game displays two
symmetric Nash equilibria. 
Figure 6: The threshold value of ¯ and the unique NE condition for multi-recipient weak con-
ditionality.
The symmetric weak conditionality equilibrium of the multi-recipient game is described by
the following Result.
Result 1 The symmetric weak conditionality contract {®c
2;m(¯);t c
2;m (¯)}d e r i v e df r o mt h e
donor program (18) has the following properties:
(i) the appropriation rate ®c
2;m is lower than in single recipient case for su¢ciently high
values of the altruism parameter, i.e. ®c
2;m(¯) <® c





,w h e r e¯¤ is given
by the intersection of the ®c
1;m(¯) schedule (given by Proposition 5) and the ®c
2(¯) schedule
(given by Proposition 3), as illustrated by Figure 7; and
(ii) it is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game
Proof. See Appendix A.1.5.
This Result shows that for su¢ciently high values of the altruism parameter (¯>¯ ¤)t h e
24donor bene…ts from the presence of multiple recipients in a context with weak commitment
power, by being able to purchase more adjustment e¤ort from each recipient than in the single
recipient case (as shown in Figure 7). This is because the presence of multiple recipients dilutes
donor altruism, making the Samaritan’s Dilemma less likely to occur, and less attractive when
it occurs (see the IR constraint in equation (19)), which strengthens the donor’s position. This
e¤ect can dominate the aid-budget e¤ect due to the presence of multiple recipients identi…ed in
the case of strong conditionality (i.e. the lower incentives on the part of the donor to purchase
adjustment e¤orts from each recipient), leading to higher reform by each recipient country.
The presence of multiple (and competing) aid recipients can therefore lead to more intense
reform e¤ort. As stated at the beginning of this section this link between the number of agents
and the intensity of the principal’s contract is analogous to the standard e¤ect present in moral
hazard models, even though it does not rely on risk-insurance considerations. We analyse some
of the policy implications of this extension of the baseline contract in next section, in the more































































This figure illustrates the optimal weak conditionality contract in a multi-recipient setting. The weak 
conditionality aid schedule ( !" t m
c
2, $ ) departs from the corresponding strong conditionality one as it crosses the 
altruism threshold $ mc
T t , () . There is a range of altruism over which the aid schedule and the altruism threshold 
coincide – the donor finds it optimal to set aid so as to leave the recipient indifferent between a no-aid outcome 
and accepting the contract. This requires a relatively fast increase of aid with altruism, and it therefore leads to a 
sharp fall in the corresponding effort level  !" #$ 2,m
c , to keep recipient utility at the no-aid level. As altruism 
increases the donor finds it optimal to allow the aid schedule to depart from the altruism threshold $ mc
T t , (), and 
grant to the recipient a higher utility level than under no-aid benchmark, which is increasing in its altruism, given 
the properties of the Samaritan’s Dilemma. This in turn implies that  !" #$ 2,m
c  is increasing in $, as in the single-
recipient case. Given the implications of strategic interaction between recipients, the effort level under weak 
conditionality ( !" #$ 2,m
c ) is below the one in the single-recipient case ( !" #$ 2
c ), for $ > $*. Note finally the 
conditional aid level  !" t m
c
2, $  lies below the t*($) schedule, implying that the weak conditionality outcome is the 
unique Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Figure 7: Weak conditionality in the multi-recipient case.
253.2 Hidden Information
I nt h i ss u b - s e c t i o no ft h ep a p e rw ed e v e l o pa ne x t e n s i o no ft h eb a s e l i n em o d e lw h i c ha l l o w s
for asymmetric information between the donor and the ruling élite in the recipient country.35
There are several ways in which asymmetric information may a¤ect conditionality contracts. We
focus here on one mechanism only, namely adverse selection due to hidden information about
the recipient’s type. We do so to highlight the formal similarity between donor conditionality
and more general mechanism design problems, and also to stress the links between the issue
of adverse selection among aid recipients and recent proposals for greater selectivity in donor
conditionality (which we discuss in the next section of the paper).
Additional mechanisms through which considerations of incomplete information could have
an impact on policy conditionality, and which we do not seek to model here, include: standard
moral hazard e¤ects (i.e. the presence of an insurance-incentives trade-o¤), due to the unob-
servability of the recipient’s reform e¤ort (see e.g. Svensson (2000a), and Pietrobelli and Scarpa
(1992)); the interaction between the dynamic structure of our set-up and the unobservability of
the agent’s actions (i.e. as in Bagwell (1995), who shows that a Stackelberg advantage, such as
the one enjoyed by the aid-recipient in our set-up, can be eroded if the donor cannot observe
the recipient’s choice of distortions ®); and the impact of hidden information considerations on
the relationship between the agent’s …rst-mover advantage and the observability of his action
(i.e. as in Maggi (1999), who shows that the Stackelberg advantage may be restored even in the
presence of noise in the observation of the …rst-mover’s action if the follower is uncertain about
the leader’s type, given that if this is the case the leader will have incentives to signal his type
with his …rst move).36;37
In the extension we consider in this sub-section the type of the agent is private informa-
tion. This is captured by the parameter µ, which determines the e¤ective cost of intoducing
income-increasing reforms for rulers (see Section 2.1). The issue of uncertainty about the true
cost of reform for political leaders of aid-receiving countries has been noted by a number of
commentators (e.g. Khaler (1992); Dollar and Svensson (2000)) in the context of conditional
aid.38 These authors stress the di¢culties of telling apart genuine reformers (i.e. low-cost of
reform types in our set-up) from opportunistic reformers, and the related potential for adverse
selection. This a¤ects the incentives of the donor when granting conditional aid and may allow
recipient governments to “sell” to donors reforms which they would have implemented anyway
(Collier (1997)).
Uncertainty about the type of the agent gives rise to a problem of optimal mechanism
design for the donor, in a fashion which is for instance analogous to the regulation of a private
monopoly under hidden information with costly public transfers (see Baron and Myerson (1982)
35Azam and La¤ont (2000) consider a model of conditionality which is similar in spirit to this extension.
36The Stackelberg (or “Samaritan’s Dilemma”) characterisation of our recipient-donor game is therefore appro-
priate as long as the uncertainty about the recipient’s type is large relative to the observation noise.
37A related result is illustrated by Lagerlof (1999), who shows that if the agent’s type is payo¤-relevant to
the principal, then the agent has incentives to signal his type by means of his …rst move, which can weaken the
Samaritan’s Dilemma and therefore strengthen a donor with weak commitment. In our set-up the type of the
recipient country does not a¤ect the donor’s utility function, so that this e¤ect is not present.
38This is treated in the more general context of international relations and rati…cation of international agree-
ments by Putnam (1988) and Iida (1993).
26and La¤ont and Tirole (1986)). In these models a regulator wants to induce a …rm to price at
marginal cost, to maximise social welfare, but it …nds it costly to make the transfers necessary to
cover the company’s …xed costs (e.g. because they need to be raised via distortionary taxation).
Similarly, in the model of conditional aid presented here, the principal wants to induce reforms
from an agent but …nds the aid transfers necessary do so costly because of imperfect altruism.
In both set-ups the presence of hidden information, and the related need to grant information
rents to some agents, induces the principal to distort the agents’ choice of e¤ort.
To illustrate the nature of optimal mechanism design in the context of conditional aid consider
a situation where the parameter µ can take one of two values, ¹ µ and µ, where ¹ µ =1and µ < 1.
This implies that the indi¤erence curves of ¹ µ-types (or high cost of reform types) are ‡atter than
the indi¤erence curves of µ-types (or low cost of reform types) when they cross, which satis…es





































Figure 8: Single crossing condition.
As Figure 8 shows a low-cost type may “envy” the conditionality contract o¤ered to a high-
cost type if this lies above its indi¤erence curve at the relevant unconditional aid equilibrium
(e.g. point A in Figure 8, which depicts an hypothetical strong conditionality equilibrium
for the high-cost type). This occurs if the level of reform e¤ort ® speci…ed in the complete
information conditionality contract designed for the high-cost type is lower than a threshold
value, which is given by the intersection of the indi¤erence curves of the two types at the
relevant no-conditionality equilibrium. We denote this threshold level of ® as ®¤(µ) (see Figure
8) and derive it formally in Proposition 6 below. If the complete-information reform e¤ort
for high-cost types is lower than ®¤(µ),40 then the donor will …nd it optimal to distort the
conditionality contracts identi…ed in the complete-information model in order to make them
39The single-crossing condition requires the agent’s type to a¤ect the slope of the agent’s indi¤erence curve in







> 0), which is satis…ed in our set-up. Given the presence of non-quasi
linear utilities additional conditions are necessary for contract implementability, which are also satis…ed in our
set-up (see Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984)).
40This in turn is the case if the altruism parameter is su¢ciently high (see Proposition 6 below).
27incentive compatible for both types and induce self-selection (by the Revelation Principle).
The standard solution to this problem is to identify the aid-reforms pair which makes both
the incentive-compatibility constraint of the low-cost types (i.e. the types which have incentive to
deviate from the full-information …rst best) and the individual rationality constraint of high-cost
types binding. With equal reservation utilities for both types this implies that the participation
constraint of low-cost type is automatically met. However in our set-up reservation utility
decreases with µ, so that the individual rationality constraint for low-cost types needs to be
included in the donor program as well.41;42




Ud =m a x
¹ ®;®;t;t
(1 ¡ v)[ln(1 ¡ t)+¯ ln(1 ¡ ® + t)] + v
£
ln(1 ¡ t)+¯ ln(1 ¡ ¹ ® + t)
¤
s:t: : Ur(®;t;µ) ¸ Ur(¹ ®;t;µ)(IC) (22)
: Ur(¹ ®;t;1) ¸ Ur(®NA(1);0;1) (IR)
: Ur(®;t;µ) ¸ Ur(®NA(µ);0;µ) (IR)
where v 2 (0;1) is the probability assigned by the donor of the agent being a high-cost
type and f¹ ®;tg and {®;tg are the contracts designed for high- and low-cost types respectively.
The solution to this program, de…ned as {^ ®c
1 (¯;µ);^ tc
1 (¯;µ)g, is characterised by the following
Proposition.
Proposition 6 The strong conditionality contract under asymmetric information over the agent’s
type has the following properties in the two-player case:
(i) it departs from the complete information contract if donor altruism ¯ is su¢ciently high,
i.e. ¯>^ ¯(µ). ^ ¯(µ) is a strictly decreasing function of µ r a n g i n gb e t w e e n0a n d1f o rµ 2 [0;1];
(ii) if ¯>^ ¯(µ),t h e n^ ®c
1 (¯;1) >® c
1 (¯;1), i.e. the contract designed for high-cost types is
distorted relative to the complete information benchmark, and it displays lower reform-e¤ort;
and
(iii) if ¯>^ ¯(µ) and IR is slack, then ^ ®c
1 (¯;µ) >® c
1 (¯;µ), i.e. the contract for low-cost
t y p e si sa l s od i s t o r t e d .I Ris slack as long as v>v ¤ 2 (0;1).
Proof. Part (i). The incentive compatibility constraint of low-cost types IC is slack under
the pair of complete information contracts f®c
1(¯;µ);t c
1(¯;µ)g with µ 2f µ;1g,i f®c
1(¯;1) >® ¤(µ).
®¤(µ) is given by the intersection of the two types’ indi¤erence curves tangential to the no-aid











, which is strictly
increasing in µ and lies between 1
4 and 1
2 for µ 2 (0;1).
^ ¯(µ) is therefore given by the inverse of ®c
1(¯;1) evaluated at ®¤ (µ). Given the properties of
®c
1(¯;1) (see Proposition 2) and those of ®¤ (µ), ^ ¯(µ) is decreasing in µ, and lies between 0 and
1f o rµ 2 [0;1].
41Under strong conditionality the reservation utility of the agent is equal to ln
µµ
(1+µ)1+µ which is decreasing in
µ: The same property applies to weak conditionality.
42This is the case also in some extensions of the standard regulation model (e.g. La¤ont and Tirole (1990)).
43We only consider strong conditionality in what follows for simplicity. Similar results apply would apply to
the weak conditionality case.
28For ¯>^ ¯(µ), IC therefore binds (i.e. the low-cost types envy the complete information
contract o¤ered to high-cost types, given that ®c
1(¯;1) <® ¤(µ)), inducing the donor to distort
the complete information contracts.
Part (ii). Using Proposition 1 and combining IR and IC (which are both binding for ¯>
^ ¯(µ)) gives the following expression for the information rents (R)o fl o w - c o s tt y p e s :
R =l n
1




which is decreasing in ¹ ®: Given that the donor dislikes granting rents to the élites in the
recipient country (see the Proof of Proposition 2) this implies that it faces an additional incentive
to increase ¹ ®; which is not present under strong conditionality with no information asymmetries.
Therefore, as long as asymmetric information is a constraint for the donor (i.e. ¯>^ ¯(µ)), ¹ ® will
be increased relative to its strong conditionality level to reduce the information rents granted
to low-cost types. Note that it is never optimal for the donor to increase ^ ®(¯;1) beyond ®¤(µ),
given that if ^ ®c
1(¯;1) = ®¤(µ),t h e nR =0(see Figure 10).
Part (iii) is obtained by substituting for the binding IR and IC into the donor’s program
and di¤erentiating with respect to ®.T h i sg i v e st h ef o l l o w i n gF O C :
(1 ¡ ¯)®1+µ +2 µ¯®µ =
µ(1 + ¯)
4¹ ®1¡µ (24)
If IR is slack and information rents R are positive, the r.h.s. of equation (24) is higher than
under strong conditionality (see the Proof of Lemma 1 and equation (23) above), which implies
a higher value of ® for the FOC to hold. If IR binds the FOC is equal to the one under strong
conditionality, and the contract is therefore not distorted.
T h ee x p e c t e dc o s tt ot h ed o n o ro fg r a n t i n gi n f o r m a t i o nr e n t st ol o w - c o s tt y p e sg o e st o0a s
v (i.e. the probability of the recipient being of a high-cost type) goes to 1. Conversely, as v
goes to 0, the expected cost of distorting the contract of high-cost types (i.e. raising ¹ ® towards
®¤(µ)), converges to 0. This implies that there is a threshold value of v, v¤ 2 (0;1),a b o v ew h i c h
IR is slack and both contracts are distorted (i.e. ^ ®c
1(¯;µ) >® c
1(¯;µ) for µ 2f µ;1g and v>v ¤).
Proposition 6 shows that for su¢ciently high values of the altruism parameter asymmetric
information may force the donor to distort both conditionality contracts and reduce adjustment
e¤orts (see Figure 9 for an illustration of this kind of equilibrium). This is the case if information
rents for low-cost types are positive. This in turn occurs for a su¢ciently high probability of the
recipient being of a high-cost type, which makes the donor unwilling to distort its contract to
the extent necessary to reduce to zero the information rents of low-cost types (i.e. by imposing
¹ ® = ®¤(µ)).
Figure 10 provides a numerical example of the donor’s optimal hidden-information condi-
tionality (assuming ¯ = µ = 1
2). This illustrates the relationship between the information rents
of low-cost types R (expressed as a percentage of their utility under complete information), the
optimal reform e¤ort of high-cost types under the hidden-information contract (i.e. ^ ®c
1(¯;1)),
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Figure 10: Numerical simulation of an optimal hidden-information full conditionality contract.
30to low-cost types falls (so that R increases), and the cost of distorting the high-cost contract
increases (implying a lower value for ^ ®c
1(¯;1)).
The results given in Proposition 6 violate the standard “no distortions at the top” results
from optimal mechanism design, which states that under hidden information contracts are not
distorted relative to their full information benchmark for the most e¢cient types. This non-
standard result arises because in our set-up agents appropriate donor transfers in proportion to
the level of reform they carry out, which implies that there is a direct interaction between reform
e¤ort and transfers.44 This interaction is such that transfers yield more utility to agents the
lower the level of reform (i.e. the higher is ®), so that the level of reform e¤ort has a marginal
impact on the e¤ectiveness of aid in providing rents to the recipient. This in turn implies that
if the donor has to grant information rents to the low-cost agent, it …nds it optimal to employ
also the reform instrument to do so, rather than simply increasing transfers (as in the standard
mechanism design set-up). Note that this relationship between reform and the agent’s rents
is also apparent from the properties of the full information weak conditionality contract (see
Proposition 3), where a more demanding participation constraint (which arises as the value of
the altruism parameter increases) induces the donor to lower reform e¤ort relative to strong
conditionality.
This extension of the baseline model shows how information de…ciencies working against the
donor may complement and strengthen commitment problems, leading to a further reduction
in the intensity of conditionality. It also shows that the baseline aid model developed in this
paper can give rise to issues of optimal mechanism design from the donor’s perspective. This
interpretation allows for a direct application of existing results in the screening literature to
the issue of conditional aid, on a number of dimensions which are of empirical relevance to
donor-recipient relationships, such as issues of common agency due to multiple donors, dynamic
interaction with ratchet e¤ects and comparative performance evaluation (see e.g. Olsen and
Torsvik (1993) and Meyer and Vickers (1997)). We discuss some of the policy implications of
the modelling of conditionality with adverse selection presented here in the following section of
the paper.
4 Discussion: Conditionality, Selectivity and Aid E¤ectiveness
In this discussion we touch upon two issues which have dominated recent academic and policy
work on how to reform donor conditionality in the context of foreign aid: selectivity and aid
e¤ectiveness. The results we have presented in this paper have implications for both of these
issues. In particular, the model of conditionality with weak commitment we have put forward
suggests that reforming policy conditionality in favour of greater selectivity is likely to be e¤ective
only if this is interpreted as introducing greater competition for donor funds amongst recipients.
Secondly, an implication of our modelling of policy conditionality with weak donor commitment
is that the presence of positive interaction between aid e¤ectiveness and reform (as suggested
by the work of Burnside and Dollar (2000)) can strengthen traditional policy conditionality.
44Note that the violation of the standard quasi-linearity assumption for the agent’s utility function is not
su¢cient per se to lead to a violation of the “no distortions at the top” result (see La¤ont and Rochet (1998)).
31There might therefore be a positive causal link running from the e¤ectiveness of aid to the
one of conditionality, which is alternative to the one working in the opposite direction (from
conditionality to aid), which is implicit in the Burnside-Dollar results.
4.1 Conditionality and Selectivity
Over the past few years there has been a signi…cant shift in donors’ thinking and rhetoric on pol-
icy conditionality. This has largely been driven by the perception that traditional conditionality
has failed to promote an e¤ective use of foreign aid, and that as a result foreign aid has largely
been unsuccessful in stimulating growth in recipient countries (Burnside and Dollar (2000)).
A number of authors have attributed the apparent failure of traditional policy-change con-
ditionality (i.e. the promise of aid in exchange for policy changes) to its ‡awed design. This
has been criticised for being time-inconsistent (given the donors’ lack of commitment power),
excessively “short-leash” (thus undermining the “ownership” of policy reforms) and too undis-
criminatory across recipient countries (and therefore not allowing committed reformers to signal
their ‘type’) (see e.g. Collier et al. (1997)).
An alternative design for aid contracts which has been recently put forward (see e.g. World
Bank (1998); Dollar and Svensson (2000)) hinges around the concept of selectivity or policy-level
conditionality. Under this alternative design donors would lend only to committed reformers,
which self-select by adopting good policies before aid is given.45 Aid would therefore serve
as an ex-post reward to countries with good policies rather than as ex-ante bribe to induce
unconvinced policy-makers to adopt such policies. This would in turn enhance the e¤ectiveness
of aid ‡ows in raising growth in recipient countries.
The concept of selectivity is arguably still rather nebulous, and susceptible to a number of
alternative interpretations. In this discussion we identify three possible approaches to donor
selectivity, which the formal results of this paper have a bearing upon.
The …rst approach would be to identify the main di¤erence between traditional conditional-
ity and selectivity as one of timing. Whilst the former is ex-ante (i.e. the donor moves before
the recipient, and o¤ers aid in tranches to induce incremental policy improvements), the latter
is ex-post (i.e. the donor rewards good policies ex-post, therefore e¤ectively front-loading the
conditionality). Our results suggest that simply modifying the timing of the donor-recipient
game cannot get around the fundamental time-inconsistency constraint on conditionality con-
tracts. This arises from the fact that the donor’s marginal utility from giving aid is higher in
bad-policy (and therefore low-income) environments, than in good-policy ones. Therefore ex-
post donors have incentives to “reward” bad policies, and would …nd it just as hard to stick to
the tough implicit threats which underlie a selectivity approach, as to comply with the explicit
threats contained in a “strong” conditionality contract (as de…ned in this paper). This suggests
that donors with weak commitment power cannot escape the consequence of the Samaritan’s
45Quoting from Dollar and Svensson (2000, p. 896):
[...] the role of donors is to identify reformers not create them. Development agencies need to devote
resources to understanding the political economy of di¤erent countries and to …nding promising
candidates to support. The key to successful adjustment lending is to …nd good candidates to
support.
32Dilemma which underlies the no-conditionality game by simply modifying the timing of the aid
game.
Indeed, the form of conditionality modelled in the stylised two-period set-up of this paper is
ex-post, in the sense that under the conditionality contract donors reward good policy levels after
the production period, granting aid in a single tranche. As we have shown, a donor with weak
commitment power can only achieve second-best conditionality in this set-up, and cannot escape
the consequences of its limited commitment powers. On the other hand, if aid e¤ectiveness and
reform interact positively, giving aid once policies have been changed can lead to more e¤ective
conditionality, as we discuss in Section 4.2.
A second interpretation of selectivity is based around the concept of yardstick competition
between recipients. This is discussed by Collier et al. (1997) and Svensson (2000b). Under
this approach selectivity implies that donors centralise their aid budgets, and give aid on the
basis of relative performance. As mentioned above, in a moral-hazard setting with strong donor
commitment, this has bene…cial incentive properties, by reducing the risk borne by agents.
Our results suggest an additional rationale for this form of selectivity, which does not rely on
risk-considerations and applies also under conditions of weak donor commitment. By inducing
recipient competition for aid, donors can worsen the attractiveness of the Samaritan’s Dilemma
from the recipients’ point of view, and exploit their ability to keep nice promises to their ad-
vantage.46 Introducing selectivity as yardstick competition is therefore a reform which can
strengthen donor conditionality.
Thirdly, one might interpret selectivity as a way of distinguishing between good and bad types
among recipient countries (e.g. as suggested by the quote from Dollar and Svensson (2000) in
footnote 45), and giving aid only to good types. This can be seen as a solution to the adverse
selection problem due to the presence of hidden information, which would consist of o¤ering a
menu of aid contracts which is only attractive to low-cost of reform types and which therefore
excludes high-cost types (see Section 3.2).
As our modelling of a situation with hidden information suggests, this is a feasible strategy
for the donor: by o¤ering only contracts which require high levels of policy reforms (i.e. low
levels of ®) in exchange for relatively little aid, the donor can induce good types to self-select,
without having to grant them information rents and distort their contract. This would however
imply not imposing any conditionality on bad types, and accepting the ine¢ciency of the no-
conditionality outcome for these countries.
As Proposition 6 shows, adopting this selectivity strategy would not be optimal for the donor:
i t se x p e c t e du t i l i t yi sh i g h e ri fi to ¤ e r sam e n uo fc o n t r a c t sw h i c ha t t r a c t sb o t hb a da n dg o o d
reformers, and induces them to self-select. The gain from inducing bad types to improve policies
therefore outweighs the loss from having to distort the contract chosen by the good types. This
is especially the case if there are many bad-types amongst aid recipients.
A …nal consideration regarding the current debate on reforming conditional aid practices is
partially related to the adverse selection point. The level of conditionality donors can impose
46This mechanism is alternative to the one identi…ed by Svensson (2000b) which relies on the presence of a
positive interaction between reform and aid e¤ectiveness, and assumes that donors care about the level of poverty
reduction rather than about the poverty level itself. Under these conditions the donor’s promise to reward good
performers is credible, as this enhances aid e¤ectiveness (in terms of poverty reduction), even though it may imply
giving little aid to countries with high poverty levels.
33even in the absence of strong commitment may appear to imply a failure of conditionality, given
that it can give rise to an inverse relationship between aid and reforms. This may tempt donors
to stop o¤ering these contracts, and disengage from bad performers. As we have shown in
this paper, this failure of conditionality is only apparent, and the weak conditionality contract is
e¢cient and it induces an improvement in policies, even though it su¤ers from the donor’s limited
commitment power. From the donor’s point of view (and from the perspective of the non-élite
population in the developing country), these contracts are still superior to the no-conditionality
outcome which would result by moving away from policy conditionality.
4.2 Conditionality and Aid E¤ectiveness
Some of the recent empirical work on the impact of foreign aid on developing countries suggests
that this has on average been ine¤ective in raising growth levels (Boone (1996); Burnside and
Dollar (2000)). The work by Burnside and Dollar (2000) also …nds that aid is e¤ective in good
policy environments, implying that a key reason behind the failure of foreign aid is the failure
of the conditionality which is attached to it. If conditionality were e¤ective in inducing good
policies, then aid would be e¤ective too.
Notwithstanding the fact that some of this empirical work is disputed from an econometric
point of view (see e.g. Hansen and Tarp (2000)), the analytical set-up presented in this paper
suggests that an alternative causal link between aid and conditionality e¤ectiveness may be
present, running from the former to the latter. That is, policy conditionality is strengthened if
aid e¤ectiveness is positively related to the quality of policies in the recipient country.
This interaction between the e¤ectiveness of aid and that of conditionality is due to two dis-
tinct e¤ects present in our model. The …rst is that, in the presence of a positive Burnside-Dollar
(BD) interaction between reform and aid e¤ectiveness, the Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium is
less attractive for the recipient. This is because under this equilibrium policy is bad, implying
that aid is relatively ine¤ective in stimulating domestic income, thereby reducing the donor’s
incentive to transfer aid and the ruling élite’s bene…ts of receiving aid.
This e¤ect can be introduced formally in the baseline model of this paper by allowing for an
aid e¤ectiveness variable e(®) which measures the impact of a given level of aid on the recipient
country’s income, i.e. yr =1¡ ® + e(®)t,s ot h a t
@yr
@t = e(®). To capture the BD interaction
e¤ect we assume that aid e¤ectiveness is positively correlated with reform (
@e(®)
@® < 0), and that
it can never be negative (e(1) > 0). This is satis…ed by a linear aid-e¤ectiveness function of the
following form, e(®)=1¡ ¸(® ¡ 1
2),w h e r e¸ 2 [0;2] measures the strength of the interaction
between policy and aid. This functional form normalises aid-e¤ectiveness to 1 at the no-aid
equilibrium (® = 1
2). The baseline model of conditional aid presented in the main body of the
paper therefore corresponds to the case ¸ =0(which implies constant aid e¤ectiveness, equal
to 1).
It is straightforward to show that in the presence of the linear aid e¤ectiveness function given
above, the Samaritan’s Dilemma is less distortionary, less attractive and thus less likely, than
in the baseline ¸ =0case.47 This strengthens the intensity of weak conditionality, in a fashion













12+4¸+¸2 (see Appendix A.1.6). This generalises the results obtained in Section 2.3 to the ¸ 2 [0;2] case:
34similar to the multi-recipient extension modelled in Section 3.1. If the positive interaction
between reform and aid e¤ectiveness is very strong (e.g. ¸ =2 , using the functional form for
e(®) given above), then the Samaritan’s Dilemma disappears, and the donor does not su¤er
from its weak commitment power.
The second e¤ect which arises from the presence of a Burnside-Dollar interaction a¤ects both
strong and weak conditionality: if better policies increase aid e¤ectiveness, then an altruistic
donor faces greater incentives to purchase reforms via conditionality. This e¤ect can be seen
in isolation from the …rst e¤ect by comparing the strong conditionality reform-e¤ort schedule
for ¸>0 and the corresponding one for ¸ =0( t h eb a s e l i n ec a s e ) . F i g u r e1 1p l o t st h e s et w o
schedules, assuming ¸ =1in the positive-¸ case, showing that conditionality is more intense in
the presence of a BD interaction term between reform and aid e¤ectiveness.48 Figure 11 also
plots the corresponding weak conditionality pro…les for ®, illustrating the fact that for ¸>0
the weak conditionality schedule departs from the strong conditionality one for higher values of
altruism than in the baseline case, and always lies below the corresponding ¸ =0one.
Policy conditionality is therefore more e¤ective in promoting reforms if aid e¤ectiveness is
driven by the quality of policies. This does not however imply that aid and reform will necessarily
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Figure 11: Reforms under strong and weak conditionality in the presence of positive reform-aid
e¤ectiveness interaction.
48Appendix A.1.6 derives the …rst order conditions of the donor’s program for ¸>0, for both strong and weak
conditionality.
355C o n c l u s i o n
Policy conditionality has been the subject of intense discussion from both a policy and an
academic perspective since the mid-1980s, when the donor practice of conditioning …nancial
assistance to the implementation of wide-ranging macroeconomic reforms in recipient coun-
tries became increasingly common. Following recent in‡uential work carried out at the World
Bank (e.g. World Bank (1998)), there has been a renewed interest in both analytical work on
conditionality, and empirical evidence on its e¤ectiveness. This has lead to a re-evaluation of
traditional forms of policy conditionality, in favour of an alternative approach with promotes
donor selectivity.
This paper contributes to the current discussion on the nature and prospects for donor
conditionality from an analytical standpoint. It clari…es the nature of conditionality contracts
and highlights a number of factors which a¤ect the donors’ ability to attach conditions to
their …nancial support. This analysis has direct implications on the desirability and potential
e¤ectiveness of introducing greater selectivity in the donors’ relationship with aid recipients.
The baseline model presented in this paper is a dynamic agency model which recognises
that aid-recipients have a structural …rst-mover advantage in their relationship with donors,
which can lead to “Samaritan’s Dilemma” outcomes. These are characterised by poor policies
in recipient countries and high aid transfers from donors, and are Pareto ine¢cient.
Conditionality contracts are needed to achieve e¢ciency in donor-recipient relationships.
“Tough” donors (i.e. who have access to strong commitment technology, as de…ned in Section
2.3.1 of the paper) can impose contracts which remove the recipient’s Stackelberg-advantage,
and lead to an optimal purchase of good policies from the donor’s perspective. On the other
hand, a donor with weak commitment power will only be able to impose a less high-powered
form of conditionality. If this is the case the donor will su¤er from its own altruism, given
the impact this has on the underlying Samaritan’s Dilemma and therefore on the recipient’s
participation constraint. This in turn can lead to an inverse relationship between aid and reform
across di¤erent recipients, as donor altruism varies, giving the impression that conditionality is
‘failing’.
The extensions considered in this paper show that donors can bene…t from the presence
of competition for aid transfers among recipients; and that they su¤er from the presence of
hidden information about the recipient’s type, which can lead to less intense (and sub-optimal)
conditionality for all types.
These results suggest that reforms of donor conditionality can be e¤ective in strengthening
the donor’s position and improving policies in recipient countries if they increase the extent to
which aid recipients compete with each other. Reforms which focus on changing the timing of
aid transfers (i.e. moving from ‘ex-ante’ to ‘ex-post’ conditionality) or that aim to exclude bad
types from conditionality contracts are likely to be unsuccessful, on the basis of the analysis
presented here.
A ne x t e n s i o no ft h ef r a m e w o r kp r e s e n t e di nt h i sp a p e rw h i c hw o u l da d dt oi t sr e a l i s ma n d
policy relevance would involve endogenising the political economy of the recipient country (e.g.
the size of the elite, as measured by µ) on the policies they implement (see e.g. Coate and Morris
(1999)). This would give further incentives to a patient donor to impose policy conditionality,
in order to induce favourable changes in the political economy of the aid-recipient. This would
36in turn strengthen one of the policy implications of this paper, namely that donors should not
disengage from ‘bad types’, excluding them from conditionality contracts.
A Appendix
A.1 Omitted Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The strong conditionality values of ® and tare given by the donor’s constrained opti-
misation program. Note …rst that the donor wants to make the recipient élite’s participation
constraint bind. This is because any aid-reform combination o¤ered by the donor as part of a
conditionality contract which leaves positive rents to the recipient relative to the no-aid equilib-
r i u mc a nb ei m p r o v e db yt h ed o n o rb ya na l t e r n a t i v ec o m b i n a t i o nw i t hh i g h e rr e f o r me ¤ o r ta n d
lower aid ‡ows which leaves recipient income unaltered and which makes the participation con-
straint bind. Substituting for tc
1(¯;1) from the participation constraint in the donor’s maximand
and maximising relative to ®c
1(¯;1) yields the following …rst order condition in ®:




T h eu n i q u ep o s i t i v er o o to f( 2 5 )i st h ev a l u eo f® given in part (i) of the Proposition.
tc
1(¯;1) is obtained by substituting the equilibrium value of ®c
1(¯;1) into the agent’s participation
constraint.
We can show that ®c













which is less than zero given that 2
p
1+3 ¯2 > 1+3 ¯:
The values of ®c
1(¯;1) at ¯ =0and ¯ =1follow by imposing ¯ =0and ¯ =1in (25)
respectively and solving for ®: The corresponding values of tc
1(¯;1) are obtained by substitution
from the participation constraint.
The rest of part (ii) of the Proposition follows from the participation constraint, which
shows that ® and t in the strong conditionality contract need to be inversely related for ®<
argmax® ®(1¡®+t)=1+t
2 , which is necessarily the case under strong conditionality (from part
(i) of Proposition 1). Therefore, if ®c
1(¯;1) is decreasing in ¯, tc
1(¯;1) needs to be increasing in
¯:
Part (iii) follows trivially from the nature of the donor’s optimisation, and is clearly illustrated
by Figure 2.
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Parts (i) and (ii) are given by following the same procedure used to prove parts (i) and
(ii) of Proposition 2, using the revised participation constraint for ¯>¯ T(1). This yields the
37following …rst order condition in ®
(1 ¡ ¯)®2 +2 ¯® = ¯ (26)
whose unique positive root is the solution for ®c
2(¯;1) in part (i). Using this solution to
substitute for ® in the recipient’s participation constraint yields the solution for tc
2(¯;1) in part
(ii).
The rest of part (i) is obtained by di¤erentiating ®c
2(¯;1) with respect to ¯ for ¯>¯ T(1):












which is always positive. The limit of ®c
2(¯;1) as ¯ tends to 1 is obtained by imposing
¯ =1in equation (26) and solving for ®. The corresponding value for tc
2(¯;1) is obtained by
substitution from the participation constraint.
The rest of part (ii) follows from the donor’s objective function. This weighs recipient
consumption by the altruism parameter. As ¯ increases the donor optimally wishes to raise
recipient consumption. Given that ® is increasing in ¯ (thereby lowering consumption ceteris
paribus), this necessarily implies that t must be increasing in ¯,t oo ¤ s e tt h ei m p a c to fh i g h e r
values of ®: This reasoning also establishes part (iii) given that under weak conditionality the
donor has incentives to raise t as ¯ increases both to increase recipient consumption and to meet
a more demanding participation constraint. This e¤ect is not present under strong conditionality
(given that in this case the IR constraint is not a function of ¯), and therefore aid ‡ows under
weak conditionality are necessarily higher than under strong conditionality.
Part (iv) derives from the fact that under weak conditionality the recipient is as well o¤ as
under the no-conditionality equilibrium (from the participation constraint) whilst the donor is
strictly better o¤, having optimised w.r.t. both ® and t,a so p p o s e dt ot only.
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Part (i). In the general µ · 1 case the donor’s constrained optimisation program yields
the following FOC:
(1 ¡ ¯)®1+µ +2 µ¯®µ = µ(1 + ¯)k1(µ) (27)
where lnk1(µ)=l n µµ
(1+µ)
1+µ is the recipient utility in the no-aid equilibrium (i.e. Ur(®NA(µ);0;µ)).
The r.h.s. of this FOC is strictly increasing in µ, i.e.
@ [µ(1 + ¯)k1(µ)]
@µ
=( 1+¯)k1(µ)(1+µlnµ ¡ µln(1 + µ)) > 0
The l.h.s. of (27) has the following properties: (i) it lies above the r.h.s. for µ =0 ; (ii) it is in-
creasing in ®; (iii) its derivative w.r.t. µ is of ambiguous sign (= ®µ ln®[((1 ¡ ¯)® +2 ¯µ)ln® +2 ¯]);
and the second derivative is negative if the …rst derivative is positive. This implies that for (27)
to hold when µ increases, we require ® to increase too, which proves part (i).
38Part (ii). In the weak conditionality µ · 1 case the donor’s constrained optimisation program
yields the following FOC for ¯>¯ T(µ):





The r.h.s. of this FOC is strictly increasing in µ, i.e.
@ [µ¯k2(µ)]
@µ
= ¯k2(µ)(1+µln2 + µlnµ ¡ µln(1 + µ)) > 0
The l.h.s. of (28) is the same as under strong conditionality, which implies that for the FOC
to hold ® and µ need to be positively correlated.
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Part (i) follows by substituting for t in the donor’s objective function in (17) from the
recipient participation’s constraint. This yields the following …rst order condition in ®:
4(2¯ ¡ 1)®2 ¡ 12¯®+1+2 ¯ =0








1+5¯2 which is always negative since 3
p
1+5 ¯2 > 2+5 ¯.
The result that ®1;m (¯;1) >® 1 (¯;1) is given by the following condition:




w h i c hi ss a t i s … e df o r¯ 2 [0; 1
2) and for ¯ 2 (1
2;1).F o r¯ = 1
2 and ¯ =1 , ®1;m (¯;1) >® 1 (¯;1)
can be veri…ed by direct substitution into the relevant …rst order conditions.
Part (ii) follows from part (i) and from the recipient’s participation constraint. As in the
single recipient case, the value of t1;m is given by imposing ® = ®1;m (¯;1) in the IR constraint.
The latter implies a negative relationship between ® and t for ®<1+t
2 ,s ot h a t
@t1;m(¯;1)
@¯
is necessarily positive if
@®1;m
@¯ < 0: Lastly it must be the case that t1;m(¯;1) <t 1 (¯;1) if
®1;m (¯;1) >® 1 (¯;1) given that the donor is facing the same recipient IR constraint in the
single and multiple recipient strong conditionality programs, so that if the appropriation rate is
increased in a multi-recipient context, aid necessarily falls.
A.1.5 Proof of Result 1
Proof. Consider …rstly the solution to the donor’s program subject to the IR constraint which
applies for ¯>¯ T
m;c(t) (i.e. the “Samaritan’s Dilemma” participation constraint in (19)) and
imposing ti = tj = t. Substituting for ® from this participation constraint yields the following
FOC:





Figure 12 plots the relevant solution to this FOC for t (de…ned as t0
2;m(¯) and computed
numerically), and the corresponding value of ® from the IR-constraint (®0
2;m(¯)), for values of















- 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0β
$ mc



























- 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0β
$ mc






























Figure 12: Interim solution to the weak conditionality multi-recipient program.
On the basis of the contract {®0
2;m(¯);t 0
2;m(¯)} we can identify three cases for weak condi-
tionality aid tc




m;c (¯) (i.e. the t0
2;m(¯) schedule lies below the ¯T
m;c(t) line in Figure 12),
then tc
2;m(¯)=t0
2;m(¯), given that the program which yields t0




m;c (¯) and tc
1;m(¯) >¯ T¡1




1;m(¯), given that in this case the donor programs for strong and weak




m;c (¯), which arises because both tc
1;m(¯) and t0
2;m(¯) are violating
the recipient’s IR constraint (the former due to insu¢cient transfers and the latter to excess
transfers), inducing the donor to move along the ¯T
m;c(t) schedule, which satis…es the recipi-
ents’ IR constraint since the no-aid payo¤ equals the “Samaritan’s Dilemma” payo¤ along this
schedule (see condition (19)).
Figure 7 illustrates the values of tc
2;m(¯) and ®c
2;m(¯) thus obtained, comparing them to
tc
2(¯), ®c
2(¯) and t¤(¯) and establishing parts (i) and (ii) of the Result.
A.1.6 Generalisation of the Conditionality Contracts with Variable Aid E¤ective-
ness
Generalising the results given for the baseline conditionality case, to allow for e(®) 6=1(as
discussed in Section 4.2 in the main text), we obtain the following outcomes. The donor’s optimal




1+¯ . This implies that the level of distortions in the Samaritan’s
Dilemma equilibrium is as follows: ®SD =
1+e(®SD)
2¡e0 . Substituting for the linear aid e¤ectiveness
function given in the text (e(®)=1¡ ¸(® ¡ 1
2),w eo b t a i n®SD = 4+¸
4(1+¸).C o m p u t i n g t h e









Strong conditionality is given by a revised donor program, which allows for the presence
of the relationship between reform and aid e¤ectiveness. Substituting from the recipient’s IR
constraint into the donor’s maximand, and di¤erentiating with respect to ®,w eo b t a i nt h e
following …rst order condition:
(1 ¡ 2®)
£
(1 + 2®)e +( 1¡ 2(®))e0®
¤
= ¯(4®(1 + e ¡ ®) ¡ 1)
This function is linear in the altruism parameter ¯, which is plotted, as a function of ®,i n
Figure 11, for ¸ =1 .
The weak conditionality schedule is given following the same procedure and accounting for
a revised recipient IR constraint. This yields the following …rst order condition in ®:
e(1 + ¯)
£
®2(e0 ¡ 1) ¡ ¯(®(1 + e ¡ ®) ¡ °)
¤




16(1+¸). This is solved for numerically for ¸ =1 , and the solution is as plotted in
Figure 11.
A.2 Conditionality in the In…nitely Repeated Game
This appendix of the paper explores the nature of conditionality in a repeated game setting. We
examine the conditions under which a long-lived donor may be able to sustain strong conditional-
ity even when it lacks commitment power and when altruism is relatively high (i.e. ¯>¯ T(µ)),
which implies that the recipient strictly prefers the Samaritan’s Dilemma outcome to strong
conditionality.
In what follows we assume that there are multiple and short-lived recipients, who interact
with the donor only once and one at the time. The donor on the other hand is long-lived,
and faces an in…nite series of recipients sequentially, interacting with each under conditions of
complete information.
A.2.1 Strong Conditionality
Can the long-lived donor sustain strong conditionality in an in…nitely repeated game? To answer
this question consider the following strategy combination:
² The donor o¤ers a strong conditionality contract {®c
1;t c
1g to each recipient. If the recipient
accepts and chooses ® = ®c
1, the donor delivers the level of aid tc
1; if not it “punishes” the
recipient, by transferring a level of aid which is contingent on the value of ® chosen by the
41recipient and which leaves the recipient as well o¤ as in the no-aid equilibrium.49 After
punishing a recipient the donor o¤ers the conditionality contract to the next recipient,
following the same strategy described above.
² Each recipient accepts the strong conditionality contract, as long as in previous interactions
between the donor and other recipients the donor has not deviated from the strategy
outlined above, i.e. the donor has not “reneged” on recipients who have accepted the
contract (i.e. transferring t<t c
1 when the recipient has chosen ® = ®c
1)a n dt h ed o n o r
has punished recipients who have previously rejected the contract. If the donor has ever
deviated from this strategy, no recipient ever trusts the donor again, and opts for the
Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium action (i.e. ® = ®SD)a l w a y s .
This strategy combination is a SPE of the repeated game for high enough donor discount
factors.50 This is because if the donor is patient enough it will value the future gain from
strong conditionality more than the short-term gains from not punishing recipients who reject
the contract or from reneging on recipients who accept the contract. The donor will therefore
stick to the strategy outlined above.
This is of course contingent on the recipient(s) punishing the donor harshly (i.e. for ever)
for any deviations from its equilibrium strategy. This is in turn is optimal given that (i) a donor
that does not punish a recipient who rejects the contract will not punish the next recipient who
also rejects, allowing recipients to obtain the Samaritan’s Dilemma outcome which is superior to
strong conditionality; and (ii) a donor who has “reneged” once on a recipient will have incentives
to cheat on the “next” recipient too, making it optimal for recipients never to trust it again.
Strong conditionality is therefore a SPE of the in…nitely repeated game if two conditions on
the donor discount factor ± are satis…ed: one stopping the donor from reneging on recipients who
accept the contract, and one inducing the donor to punish recipients who reject the contract.
The …rst of these conditions is obtained by comparing the one-o¤ payo¤ from reneging on
a recipient who has accepted the contract (which we denote as Ud(renege_strong))a n dt h e
in…nite stream of utility from the Samaritan’s Dilemma equilibrium which arises as all future






49Any level of aid below this level is sub-optimal for the donor, as it does not incentivise recipients to accept
the conditionality contract, and it lowers the donor’s utility. The de…nition of strong conditionality used here is
therefore di¤erent from the one given in the main text of the paper in terms of the “out-of-equilibrium path”
behaviour of the donor (i.e. t 6=0if ® 6= ®
c
1), and it is a more reasonable one in the context of a repeated game.
Note that this punishment strategy deviates from the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the stage game (as
described by Proposition 1) . Restricting our attention to punishment strategies which correspond to equilibria
of the stage game would rule out strong conditionality as an equilibrium of the repeated game.
50This follows Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), who show that any equilibrium within the feasible and individually
rational payo¤ set (i.e. such that all players obtain more than their Minimax value) can be sustained as a perfect
equilibrium of an in…nitely repeated game for high enough discount factors. The presence of a short-lived player
implies that punishment strategies implemented by the recipient need to be a short-run best response, which is
satis…ed by the strategy described in the text (Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin (1990)).
42The second condition is given by comparing the donor’s payo¤s from punishing a recipient
who rejects the contract once (Ud(punish_strong)) and then reverting back to strong condition-










Weak conditionality is an equilibrium of the repeated game if the donor is patient enough not to
want to renege on recipients who accept the contract, assuming that the donor and the recipients
follow the same strategies described for strong conditionality (with the exception that the donor
is now o¤ering a weak rather than a strong conditionality contract). Note that we do not need
to check the second condition that the donor …nds it optimal to punish recipients who reject the
contract in this case, since under weak conditionality no recipient would want to do so.






where the notation is analogous to the one used for strong conditionality.
A.2.3 Comparison
Conditions (29) and (30) imply the following four cases for the equilibria of the in…nitely repeated
game:
Condition Strong conditionality Weak conditionality
is an equilibrium is an equilibrium
± ¸ max(±1
strong;±2














Figure 13 plots the values of ±1
strong, ±2
strong and ±1
weak for the case µ =1 ,s h o w i n gw h e r e
each of these four cases applies.51 The combination of ± and ¯ which gives rise to the fourth
case is highlighted in the shaded area. This shows that there exist parameter combinations for
which weak conditionality is an equilibrium outcome and strong conditionality is not, even in
a in…nitely repeated interaction. However, for most values of the discount factor (i.e. ±>20%
approximately), both weak and strong conditionality are an equilibrium of the in…nitely repeated
game. This multiplicity of equilibria is of course not surprising given the predictions of the Folk
Theorem that all points in the set of weak and individually rational payo¤s F¤ can be sustained
51Note that ±
2
full =0for ¯ = ¯
T(1) =
1
3, given that in this case Ud(SD)=Ud(punish_strong).F o r h i g h e r
values of ¯ punishing recipients who reject conditionality hurts the donor, which therefore needs to attach enough
weight to future payo¤s to be willing to do so.
43as equilibria for high enough discount rates. Figure 14 plots the payo¤ space implied by the
conditionality game for a given value of ¯ (i.e. ¯ = 3
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Figure 14: The payo¤ space F¤ in the conditionality game (for ¯ = 3
4).
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